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Abstract 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) are at a critical juncture. As of 2002, the 
process of adapting Turkey’s legal framework to the EU’s political membership criteria 
began in earnest. The legislative amendments carried out in this respect amount to one of the 
largest, most wide-ranging reform processes Turkey has ever experienced. At the level of 
legislation, it involves updating Turkey’s laws to ensure that the prerequisites of a stable, 
pluralist democracy are in place, and that human rights are respected. In order for these 
amendments to be passed, however, the reforms must also be continuously justified vis-à-vis 
key constituencies. In this respect, the reforms are not only interesting from the perspective 
of EU-Turkey relations. They come at a crucial time in Turkey’s domestic politics, and pose 
a challenge to some of the most fundamental divisions in the country’s political party 
system. For the secularist state elite, supporting the reforms entails loosening their grip on 
the state, and allowing the public expression of Muslim and Kurdish identities. For the 
Islamic party elites, it involves modifying their anti-Western rhetoric, and reconciling their 
interests with the universalist norms expressed in the EU’s membership criteria. Thus, 
successfully following through with the legal prerequisites of EU membership requires not 
only legal engineering, but also a radical shift in Turkey’s political culture.  
Against this background, this thesis addresses the question of how representatives of 
Turkey’s largest political parties have framed the reforms in public discourse. Specifically, 
using a qualitative and quantitative content analysis, it analyzes the debates in Turkey’s 
Grand National Assembly regarding a selection of key adaptation packages, and measures to 
what extent Turkish MPs, when justifying or opposing the amendments, have distanced 
themselves from the  antagonistic ideologies with which they have been associated in the 
past.  
The analysis finds that they have. In general, all of the parties have moderated their 
antagonistic discourses, and have emphasized the inherent and universal validity of the 
norms underlying them. The only clear exception is the far-right Nationalist Action Party, 
whose MPs see the reforms as a threat to Turkey’s unity. Interestingly, the analysis also 
finds that among the more moderate parties, those traditionally associated with the secular, 
Westernized state elite have had the most difficulties in adapting to the EU’s criteria. The 
Islamic parties, including the Justice and Development Party currently in government, have 
consistently emphasized the need for strengthening civil society and guaranteeing the 
freedom of speech and conscience. Although this may to some extent be a matter of self-
interest, there are also indications that this is not the case.  
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1. Introduction 
This thesis addresses the appropriation of parts of the European Union’s (EU) acquis 
communautaire in the context of Turkish elite political discourse. Specifically, by analyzing 
debates in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TGNA),1 it 
seeks to answer the question of how Turkish party representatives have framed the issue of 
adapting to the EU’s political conditionality. 
Turkey became associated with the European Economic Community in 1963 and formally 
applied for EU membership in 1987, but it was not until the Helsinki Summit of 1999 that it 
was granted candidate status for EU membership. Having sufficiently harmonized its internal 
market and customs regime with that of the EU, Turkey was then considered ready to go on 
with the considerable political and legal reforms stipulated in the accession acquis in 
preparation for full membership. In December 2004, the European Council decided on 
conditions for the opening of membership negotiations, which commenced October 2005.  
However, membership is not inevitable. The negotiation framework adopted in October 
2005 stresses that the membership talks are “an open-ended process, the outcome of which 
cannot be guaranteed beforehand” (Commission 2005: § 2). Moreover, Turkey’s future road 
to membership seems littered with obstacles to an extent not encountered in negotiations 
with any other candidate country. As of this writing (November 2006), the latest Progress 
Report on Turkey expresses serious misgivings about the progress achieved in nearly all 
sections of the acquis (Commission 2006).  
Ultimately, this unpredictability and lack of commitment can be ascribed to the fact that both 
sides of the equation, Turkey and the EU, contain domestic conflicts that are to a large 
degree mutually contingent. As Ugur (1999; 2003) has argued, the membership negotiations 
can be seen as a two-level game, where the conditions placed on policy formulation and 
implementation by the domestic political context are at least as important as the international 
level of the actual negotiations. While convergence at the international level requires that 
Turkey and the EU make credible commitments vis-à-vis each other, making and following 
                                                
1 For the sake of readability, English abbreviations will here be used throughout when referring to 
Turkish institutions, laws, and parties.  
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through with these commitments require that legitimacy is maintained vis-à-vis 
constituencies and important pressure groups at the national level. Because the political 
cultures and historically dependent internal conflicts of Turkey and the EU member 
countries differ to a considerable degree, the ways in which the latter type of legitimacy can 
be achieved varies depending on the context.  
This thesis focuses on the Turkish context. Since the Helsinki Summit, Turkey’s process of 
adapting to EU conditionality has gained momentum through Turkey’s National Program for 
the Adoption of the Acquis (Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye 
Ulusal Programı, NPAA). The NPAA was initiated by the Turkish Government in March 
2001, and has been revised once to adjust to an evolving acquis. As a whole, the NPAA is a 
very broad program, aimed at fulfilling institutional, financial, and political criteria. It 
outlines 89 new laws, and foresees amending 94 existing laws, to be enacted in a number of 
legislative “harmonization packages.” This thesis limits itself to addressing the first to the 
sixth harmonization packages that have been enacted, leading up to the announcement by the 
EU Presidency during the Brussels European Council of 16-17 December 2004 that Turkey 
had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria to enter into membership negotiations. The 
analysis thus covers some of the adaptations in which the specifically political aspects of EU 
conditionality were addressed. Furthermore, it focuses on how a specific group of Turkish 
society, namely, the representatives of the seven largest political parties in Parliament 
during the two parliamentary terms in question, has justified or objected to these adaptations 
in the context of parliamentary debates. 
1.1 The Copenhagen Criteria and the NPAA 
From the perspective of the EU, several factors contribute to explaining why Turkey’s road 
to EU membership candidacy has been more difficult than that of any other candidate 
country. As long as the EU remained a primarily economic union, the question of Turkish 
membership was limited to Turkey’s willingness to adjust its economic policies to that of the 
EU, and its ability to cope with competitive market forces (Rumford 2000). Since the 
beginning of its relations with Turkey, however, the EU has gone through an internal process 
of deepening, developing beyond the confines of economic cooperation to become a polity 
with “probably […] the most formalised and complex set of decision-making rules of any 
political system in the world” (Hix 2005: 3). This development, occurring in tandem with an 
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enlargement process that has expanded the number of member countries from six to twenty-
five, has necessitated a formal redefinition of the EU’s legal personality in terms that enable 
it to judge whether new a candidate country is similar enough to the EU in important 
respects to become a member. The Copenhagen Criteria, formulated during the European 
Council of June 1993, have become an important reference point in determining a country’s 
eligibility for membership. The Copenhagen Criteria stipulate that, in addition to having a 
functioning market economy, a country that wishes to become a member of the EU must 
prove that it “has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,” and furthermore that it is able to 
adhere to these obligations (Council 1993: § 7). These criteria have since been incorporated, 
in a slightly adapted form, into article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union and in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. It has also been incorporated into the 90,000-page (and 
growing) accession acquis, where the criteria concerning democracy, legal order, and human 
rights constitute what are referred to as political criteria.  
Given these criteria, it may seem quite obvious why Turkey has been seen as a special case. 
Turkish democracy, now in its sixth decade, has appeared to be caught in a cycle resembling 
the “modal pattern” (cf. Malloy 1977), oscillating between periods of dysfunctional electoral 
competition, military coups, and interim military rule. Widespread torture has been reported, 
both in the southeastern regions, where internal warfare against Kurdish insurgencies have 
displaced thousands, and among the police forces of larger cities (AI 2006; HRW 2005). The 
military, whose priorities and budget have long been exempt from public accountability, has 
had an inordinate amount of influence on all three branches of government, and has 
repeatedly used that influence to limit the freedom of speech and organization for ethnic and 
religious minorities, including repeatedly dissolving parties that it has deemed detrimental to 
the secular and unified nature of the state. In turn, both state institutions and political parties 
have been afflicted with rampant corruption. Thus, in effect, Turkey has been in violation of 
all of the central institutional and political tenets of the Copenhagen Criteria from the outset.  
As has been argued before, however, these essentially moral obstacles do not sufficiently 
explain the EU’s behavior toward Turkey. An identity-based sense of cultural and religious 
difference also seems to be salient, affecting the perception of Turkey’s eligibility for 
membership (Öniş 1999; Sjursen 2002).  Although there are arguably many reasons for 
Turkey’s democratic deficiencies, including a stumbling economy and dramatic 
demographic developments, a widespread notion among Europeans associates these 
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problems with Turkey’s perceived lack of cultural affinity with Europe’s Christian and 
Enlightenment heritage. The notion that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with secular 
democracy has been fortified by post-9/11 developments around the world,2 developments 
that, in turn, have been easy to exploit by right-wing populist politicians skeptical to EU 
elites and Muslims alike.3 Moreover, this perception is not limited to political contestation 
on the level of European domestic politics. Compared to other recent candidate countries, the 
EU’s pre-accession financial support for democratic reform in Turkey has been much 
smaller, suggesting that these concerns are in force also at EU elite level (Lundgren 1998; 
2005; 2006). Thus, as Öniş (1999: 117) points out, “The arguments concerning economic 
backwardness and deficiency of democratic institutions have been used for helping the 
Eastern Europeans over a difficult period of adjustment, while similar deficiencies have been 
identified as a barrier for Turkey's admission to the EU as a full member.”  
While the political aspects of EU conditionality are framed in terms of universally 
acceptable norms, then, there is good reason to pay attention to their effect when embedded 
in domestic political contexts. The Copenhagen Criteria exhibit willingness on the part of the 
EU to judge Turkey’s eligibility in fair and equal terms with other candidate countries, and 
to make accession dependent on criteria that are deemed legitimate by all parties, regardless 
of cultural characteristics. As Benhabib and Türküler (2006) argue, however, their 
universalistic character can also be seen as a way of avoiding formulations in terms of 
“thick” cultural criteria, while indirectly retaining the requirement that “thin” institutional 
changes are attended by deeper changes in actor perceptions and motivations. As such, they 
provide considerable room for interpretation and politicization by domestic political actors. 
In the EU, this has resulted in a mixture of liberal and communitarian, or, in more abstract 
                                                
2 Among the events that received the most worldwide attention were the bombings in Madrid in 
March 2004, the actual and attempted bombings in London during July 2005, the riots among 
immigrant youth in France in October and November 2005, and the worldwide unrest provoked by 
the controversy over Danish and Norwegian cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in February 
2006.  
3 Jörg Haider’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, Front National in France, and Vlaams 
Belang in Belgium are among the most prominent of these. As the referenda on the European 
Constitution in 2005 showed, however, perceptions of irreconcilable differences between Turks and 
other Europeans were not limited to these far-right parties, but were found on both sides of the 
political left-right divide. As has been suggested by Boomgaarden and Vreese (2005), the prospect of 
increased immigration by Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population may even prove to be a 
decisive factor in determining further referenda on EU enlargement.  
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terms, universalist and particularist arguments concerning Turkish membership. In Turkey, 
the same dynamic can be observed in the problems faced by political parties in commending 
the reforms of the NPAA while remaining true to their ideological commitments. 
Consequently, to understand the Turkish reaction to EU conditionality, it is first necessary to 
understand what particular conditions the political culture of Turkey places on their 
reception.  
As a whole, the NPAA is a remarkably broad program, comparable in significance to the two 
previous large-scale reform movements in Turkish history, the Tanzimat of the mid-
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, and the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s 
(Barchard 2005). Like the previous reform movements, it involves making changes to 
fundamental characteristics of the country’s political regime, and necessitates a concomitant 
shift in political culture that goes far beyond institutional engineering. As opposed to those 
previous reform movements, however, the NPAA has been drafted, enacted, and revised by 
democratically elected governments and parliaments, under the auspices of political actors 
whose stake in the reforms are to a considerable degree perceived to be in conflict. Thus, if 
the acquis can be thought of as the product of an uneasy mix of universalist norms and 
particularist interests in the EU, the NPAA must be thought of as Turkey’s “translation,” 
adapted so as to accommodate the conditions placed on justifying legislation at the level of 
Turkish domestic politics.  
The tri-party coalition government that originally drafted the NPAA in 2001 was formed 
after elections characterized by the salience of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam. Two 
of the parties in the coalition, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DLP) and 
the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, NAP), were quite far apart on a 
conventional left-right scale, but had in common a state-centered view of national security, 
and a policy of zero tolerance on both ethnic separatism and the representation of religion in 
politics (Başkan 2005). This somewhat contradictory state of affairs made the debates on 
some of the political criteria addressed by the NPAA difficult. The NPAA itself testifies both 
to the resolution of the coalition partners to move on with the required reforms, and to their 
difficulties in doing so while maintaining credibility as representatives of distinct values and 
interests (Avcı 2006: 158). The first six harmonization packages, to which this thesis is 
limited, address some of the most acute legal obstacles to democratic accountability and the 
guarantee of basic rights and freedoms, but have also been criticized for being “watered-
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down versions of what was really needed” (Ibid.). While space precludes listing all the 
amendments in detail, the most significant of them include: 
- Amending parts of the criminal legislation that allowed sentencing of individuals perceived 
as having publicly “offended Turkishness,” the Turkish nation or state, the TGNA, the 
Army, or any representative thereof, or as having used religious or racial divisions to disrupt 
the order of Turkish society; 
- Abolishing the death penalty in peacetime; 
- Allowing for retrials in cases where complaints are or have already been upheld in the 
European Court of Human Rights, including the cases of imprisoned deputies from Kurdish 
parties; 
- Allowing for schooling and public broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (i.e., 
Kurdish); 
- Easing restrictions on setting up clubs or associations, and allowing associations to open 
offices abroad and seek membership in international organizations; 
-  Introducing measures for the prevention of torture and unfair treatment by police and 
courts. 
1.2 Why Study the Parliamentary Discourse of Turkish 
Political Parties? 
In electoral democracies, political parties are the only legally recognized, organized 
contenders for legislative and governmental power. As such, they play a crucial role in 
obtaining legitimacy4 for legislation. In democracies, the legitimacy of the actions of 
political parties in parliament or government stems from a combination of formal and 
informal characteristics, the former pertaining to procedural premises governing the 
decision-making process, the latter to the substance of the decisions themselves (Luhmann 
1983: 31). Formally, parties function as representatives of interest groups insofar as party 
members are duly elected to seats in accordance with democratic election procedures. Once 
                                                
4 Note that legitimacy is here understood in Weberian, positive terms, as acceptance of the criteria on 
which political decisions are made (Weber 1968: 24-5). No claims are made in this thesis as to the 
inherent validity of any such criteria.  
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elected, their representative function is realized through legislation in parliament, and, if 
possible, by forming a government. For the individual party, however, this formal legitimacy 
can only be realized if it is able to present itself, through discourse and action, as 
representing particular values or interests in more than a purely nominal sense. They must, in 
a sense, fulfill the expectation that they act “for” or “on behalf of” their voters (Pitkin 1967). 
While formal legitimacy refers to the overall function of parties in an electoral democracy, 
then, the continuously iterated self-presentation of parties legitimates the existence and 
holding of power by specific parties with specific agendas, as mediators between voters’ 
preferences and public outcomes.  
It has long been argued that in terms of ideological positioning, a single, encompassing 
center-periphery divide has tended to subsume almost all other persistent issues dividing 
Turkish society (Heper 1985; Mardin 1973; Özbdudun 1980; Sayarı 1978). The “center,” 
represented by the nationalist, republican, centralist, statist tradition of Kemalism, has 
identified closely with the bureaucracy, state, and Armed Forces, and has been extremely 
suspicious towards what it sees as the centrifugal forces of the “periphery.” The “periphery,” 
in turn, refers to the ethnically and culturally heterogeneous masses, originally rural but 
increasingly urbanized, who have been defined by the “center” as backward-looking, 
traditionalist, and, if openly hostile, as reactionary (irticai). The result of this divide has been 
an unstable party system, characterized by high levels of conflict. The close identification of 
certain parties with the “center” has made the preservation of the secular and monocultural 
state their overriding principle of legitimacy, at the detriment of the procedural legitimacy 
associated with democracy. The “periphery,” in turn, has at times reacted to the lack of 
venues for participation with violence, creating an atmosphere of “politics as war.” Between 
the major parties, elections have often been viewed as zero-sum games over the control of 
the entire state apparatus, rather than just over governmental power. This has inevitably 
provoked the military into action, making it a central, if reluctant, political actor. Thus, until 
quite recently, it could be asserted that in Turkey, “the line separating opposition from 
treason is still rather thin compared to older and more stable democracies” (Özbudun 1995: 
246). 
Lately, however, several observers have argued that since the 1980 coup d’état, the center-
periphery divide has been showing signs of erosion. Long-term globalization processes have 
contributed to strengthening the coherence and status of civil society, enabling actors that 
were previously excluded from the public sphere to participate in redefining the shape and 
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boundaries of the state (Keyman and Özbudun 2002; Toprak 1995). As against the 
traditional state elite, “counter-elites” have emerged as formidable contenders, building on 
significant economic and cultural bases (Göle 1997). As a consequence, claims to 
universalism that were previously monopolized by the state elite through its scientifically 
inspired brand of social engineering are being challenged by ethnic and religious minorities, 
feminists, and Islamists, whose claims to legitimate political representation combine 
particularistic interests with global discourses of universal rights (Gülalp 2001; Rumford 
2000; 2002).  
These changes undoubtedly have their roots in a combination of economic, cultural, and 
political opening towards the Western world. At the level of party competition, though, it has 
been argued that it is the prospect of EU membership, and in particular the process of 
adapting to the economic and political conditionality of the EU, that has been the decisive 
factor in reshaping Turkey’s political culture (Duran 2006; Kubicek 2005; Müftüler-Baç 
2000; Öniş 2003a; Senem and Keyman 2004; Tocci 2005; Wood and Quaisser 2004). The 
EU, it is argued, has provided the needed external impetus to initiate reforms; in addition, it 
has functioned as a political “anchor,” allowing parties to lay their antagonisms aside to the 
extent needed for going through with many of the required democratization measures (Ugur 
1999). The result has been a moderation across the spectrum of political parties, and a shift 
from conflicts associated with the center-periphery cleavage to more universalist themes. 
In particular, considerable interest has lately been devoted to the party currently in 
government, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, JDP). The JDP 
has roots in the Islamist National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement, but has moderated the 
religious stance of its predecessor parties in favor of what has been called “enlightened self-
interest” (Özel 2003: 174). In its public discourse, the JDP has articulated what it calls its 
ideology of “conservative democracy,” a mix of liberal “third way” economic reforms and 
an appeal to the inherent value of democratization. According to some, its justification of the 
EU-related reforms have been in the nature of universally acceptable rights-based arguments, 
as against both the state-centered arguments of the “center” and the particularistic interests 
traditionally associated with the “periphery” (Avcı 2006). This shift in discourse, combined 
with the current government’s success so far in negotiations with the EU, may signal a 
broader change to come in the tone of political competition.  
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However, this process has by no means been frictionless, and is not over yet. Despite overall 
support for EU membership in the population,5 the largest political parties remain to a large 
degree bound by their traditional ideological commitments, and finding the right balance 
between accommodating change while remaining relevant contenders for government is 
proving difficult for many (Çarkoğlu 2003). Turkey’s political parties bear the brunt of the 
ideological dilemmas posed by EU conditionality, and must find ways to redefine 
themselves in a new context. On the question of EU membership, the republican elite finds 
itself torn between “longing and resentment” (Keyder 2006: 75), the desire to continue the 
modernization and Westernization envisioned by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s, and 
the equally strong need for centralized control dictated by their discourse of national pride 
and sovereignty. Equally paradoxical is the position of Islamist elites, who must negotiate a 
position between the anti-Western sentiments of Islamic fundamentalists, and the promise of 
religious freedom implied by the Copenhagen Criteria (Dağı 2005).  
Although there have been several studies of Turkey’s changing party system, serious 
attempts at substantiating claims about political elites’ mentality or frame of reference are 
rarely found. Among those who focus on party politics, most have been in the nature of 
impressionistic reports based on a wide variety of sources, including newspaper articles, 
television appearances, and party programs. In spite of the pivotal role of the TGNA in 
justifying and enacting legislation, few attempts have been made to study it directly. There 
are earlier surveys of the TGNA’s social composition (cf. Tachau 1988) and enquête-based 
surveys of MPs’ understanding of the EU (McLaren and Müftüler-Baç 2003), but the readily 
available minutes of debates in plenary sessions, where the actual debating takes place, have 
“hardly been exploited” (Dorronsoro and Massicard 2005: §8). This means that a 
voluminous and detailed source of real-life confrontations between elite representatives of 
Turkey’s political divisions remains unexplored.  
By analyzing the discourse of the largest parties in the TGNA during legislative debates, 
then, this thesis seeks to ascertain how the NPAA has provided Turkish parties with an 
opportunity to redefine themselves, and to what extent they have seized that opportunity. 
The analysis thus contributes to several current debates. In addition to contributing to 
                                                
5 Note, however, that support for membership seems to have diminished since the accession 
negotiations commenced. Between the Eurobarometer polls of October 2001 and May 2005, overall 
support for membership sank from 59% to 50%. See Eurobarometer (2001; 2005). 
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research on democratization in Turkey, it can be expected to shed some light on the future of 
EU-Turkish relations. More generally, the fact that the TGNA during the terms in question 
contained two parties originating from the same Islamist movement, one still professing 
Islamist leanings, the other claiming secularism among its key principles, makes the analysis 
relevant for theorizing the compatibility of Islam and democracy, a question that has been at 
the forefront of scholarly discussion in recent years. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The central aim of this thesis is to investigate to what extent, and how, thematics and 
arguments associated with the center-periphery and universalist dimensions have been drawn 
on by the representatives of Turkish political parties in debating the amendments of the 
NPAA. In terms of research typologies, then, this study is perhaps best categorized as a 
theoretically guided, evaluative, descriptive, and exploratory case study (Yin 2003). Its case 
is the discursive treatment of parts of the NPAA by MPs in a parliamentary setting; thus, 
‘case’ must here be taken in a nominalist sense, as a socially and institutionally constituted 
process, singled out for scientific purposes (cf. Blaikie 2001: 215-18; Ragin 1992). The 
evaluative and descriptive components consist of testing a political-historical hypothesis  - 
that the universalist dimension is gaining ground in the Turkish party system, and therefore 
will be the most salient in the debates - directly against discursive material. Here, some 
amount of exploration is inevitable, as discourse very rarely allows for simple, clear-cut 
inferences. It is all the more important, therefore, that the entire process is theoretically 
guided by explicitly stated ontological and epistemological notions about the nature and 
function of political discourse, and the ways in which inferences can be made about it.  
The analysis of spoken and written discourse is a wide and heterogeneous field, both in 
terms of basic theoretical assumptions and methodologies. In this study, I have chosen issue 
framing as the central organizing concept and analytical construct. Chapter 2 is devoted to 
explaining what issue framing means, and to delineating and delimiting the scope of 
inferences it allows me to make from the analysis of parliamentary discourse.  
The notion of issue framing essentially assumes that occurrences of culturally and 
ideologically salient themes and arguments will tend to be unevenly distributed among 
representatives of different political parties when they are engaged in discussing an issue. 
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Thus, there is both a quantitative and qualitative dimension to issue framing; both the 
quantitative distribution of themes and arguments and their ideological significance in the 
context of Turkish society must be measured. To this end, I here utilize a two-level content 
analysis, with both quantitative and qualitative components. Chapter 3 discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of this method, and explains each procedure in detail. 
The content analysis used here involves operationalizing the universalist and center-
periphery dimensions of Turkish party politics as nominal variables referred to as coding 
dimensions. To ensure that the measurement does not become biased, these coding 
dimensions have been devised prior to the coding of the texts, based on secondary literature 
on the Turkish party system. In order to contextualize these dimensions, in chapter 4, I 
discuss their ideological significance in the Turkish party system. I also explain how the 
parties that participated in the debates have historically positioned themselves in relation to 
these dimensions, and what themes they are associated with in the academic literature. This 
provides the study with a background against which the results of the content analysis can be 
compared.   
Chapter 5 summarizes, analyzes, and interprets the findings of the content analysis for each 
party. The percentwise distribution of themes and arguments for each party here provides a 
basis for discussing the ways in which the parties have used them in order to justify or 
criticize the amendments, and to what extent this use contrasts with our expectations based 
on Chapter 4. Finally, chapter 6 discusses what conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.  
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2. Issue framing 
In political science, the identities, attitudes, and positions of political parties are often 
impressionistically inferred from a variety of sources. Some notion of “schemata,” 
“mindset,” “ideology,” or “cognitive framework” is commonly presupposed to influence the 
perceptions and actions of political actors, but the precise way in which these can be mapped 
is often left to the imagination. This is sufficient for many purposes, but does not provide the 
theoretical framework needed for discourse analysis. In this thesis, the center-periphery and 
universalist dimensions of Turkish political discourse will be treated as nominal variables 
and applied to the selected parliamentary debates. The way in which these variables are 
operationalized relies on a number of assumptions about the role of language in representing 
the situational definitions and values of parties. Specifying these assumptions will both 
delimit the scope of inferences, and provide an analytical framework for interpreting the 
results. Therefore, before we move on to explaining the method used, some observations on 
the concept of issue framing are in order. 
2.1 Frames and issue framing 
For the purpose of this study, the center-periphery and universalist dimensions will be 
referred to as consisting of distinct frames. Issue framing will here be defined as discourse in 
which political issues are discursively represented in terms of a subset of potentially relevant 
considerations. This subset of considerations derives from, and recreates, frames.6 
We may think of frames as cognitive or conceptual structures that enable us to recognize and 
communicate patterns in our environment. Such structures probably begin to be constructed 
in early childhood, and initially encompass physical qualia and basic human relations 
(Lakoff 1987; Sebeok and Danesi 2000). As an individual grows older and becomes 
socialized, a wider range of environmental factors interacts with the construction of frames. 
These include social relations on several scales, from one’s family and closest circle of 
                                                
6 This formulation is an adapted version of the definition offered by Druckman (2004). Note that 
although the term ‘frame’ is used in this thesis, the variety of terms in circulation make it necessary 
to occasionally refer to authors who, although referring to different terms, essentially discuss the 
same phenomenon.  
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friends, to characteristics of the larger social communities one belongs to, such as national 
cultures, class, and political orientations. As frames evolve in relation to these contexts and 
meta-contexts, they come to encompass expectations and values consonant with cultural, 
socio-economic and institutional characteristics (Lemke 1995). Thus, according to Chilton 
(2004: 51), frames are 
… structures related to the conceptualisation of situation types and their 
expression in language. Situations involve ‘slots’ for entities (animate and 
inanimate, abstract and concrete, human and non-human), times, places, with 
relationships to one another, and having properties. The properties include 
cultural knowledge about such things as status, value, [and] physical make-
up. Certain properties specify prototypical roles in relation to other entities – 
for example, whether a participant entity is acting as an agent, on the 
receiving end of action, experiencing a sensation, and the like.  
Because frames are cognitive constructs, they can only be shared, spread, and reproduced 
through externalized representations. Framing thus refers to the discursive representation of 
frames.  
Framing is of particular importance for the analysis of political discourse. Institutional 
political discourse is normally understood to revolve around “issues,” where specific 
problems, or real or perceived conflicts, are brought up and discussed in terms of their 
possible solutions. In our understanding, framing does not only involve suggesting solutions; 
it also contributes towards defining political issues. Thus, at the level of specific discourse 
situations, framing means “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993: 
52, italics in original). By selecting some aspects of reality and leaving others out, an issue 
comes to be defined as worthy of attention in some respect. In political discourse, then, 
framing is a kind of “second-level agenda setting,” where issues that have already been 
brought up are made to be discussed on certain premises (McCombs et al. 1997; cited in 
Scheufele 1999: 103). Those aspects that are made salient contribute toward construing an 
image of what agents are involved in the issue, what moral considerations it touches upon, 
and how one should go about collectively dealing with it.  
In terms of discourse properties, framing manifests itself as selection and salience (Entman 
1993: 52). Put simply, selection means that some aspects of reality are left out, other aspects 
mentioned. Salience implies that among those aspects that are mentioned, some are made 
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more noticeable, and brought to the forefront of attention. This subset of considerations 
manifests itself at the level of discourse as patterned repetition of themes that resonate with 
culturally or ideologically familiar concepts (Ibid.: 53; Lemke 1983: 164). 
An important point worth noting is that issue framing does not carry any particular 
connotations as regards an argument’s soundness or veracity. Frames need not be coherent in 
a logical sense, and the extent to which the way they represent an issue is true is of 
secondary importance when analyzing discourse.7 Although scientific discourse is oriented 
toward truth-values, the scientific quest for truth must not be unduly projected on non-
scientific discourse (Luhmann 1990). In most discourse situations, “truth is just a common 
foot soldier in a much larger semantic army, just one among many attributes of propositions 
deriving from the system of orientational and attitudinal stances our culture and language 
allows speakers to take toward the presentational content of their own discourse” (Lemke 
1995: 44).  
The same can be said of sincerity. Although frames, in order to be effective, must resonate 
with culturally salient patterns of value orientations, this does not preclude their conscious 
use by political elites. Frames can be consciously analyzed, manipulated, and used for 
strategic purposes by participants in a discourse situation. Just as we will be analyzing 
frames in this study, so MPs may analyze their country’s current situation for clues about 
what themes will be most effective in justifying or opposing a proposal. While taking into 
account local contextual features of a given discourse situation can go some way toward 
disclosing such use, in the final analysis, the question of whether the framing of an issue is 
due to an MPs personal conviction or is an instance of strategic positioning cannot be 
determined.  
                                                
7 This study thus ignores the distinction that is sometimes made between “equivalence framing” and  
“emphasis framing” (or “issue framing”). In studies by Druckman (2001; 2004) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981; 1987), for example, “equivalence framing” refers to situations where the “same 
information,” or “logically equivalent” statements, are presented in different wordings, and thus 
cause the recipients to form different opinions. This distinction is made on the theoretical ground that 
“equivalency framing,” unlike “emphasis framing,” challenges the premise of preference invariance, 
and thus poses a challenge to rational choice theory. In my view, this distinction is problematic when 
applied to real-life political discourse, because it assumes the ability of the researcher to distinguish 
between true and false representations of highly complex political issues.  
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2.2 Issue framing in the TGNA 
The definition of frames and framing has so far purposely been left simple and applicable to 
an almost unlimited number of political discourse situations. In analyzing parliamentary 
discourse, a number of additional assumptions are made that should be pointed out, both 
with regard to parliamentary contexts in general, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA) in particular. 
In common parlance, a parliamentary debate is “a formal gathering of a group of elected 
representatives, members of various political parties, engaging in a discussion about what 
collective action or policy to undertake concerning an issue of public concern” (van Dijk 
2000a). Here, however, the assumption is made that parliamentary discourse also serves the 
function of allowing MPs to iterate and negotiate their parties’ positions vis-à-vis each other 
in face-to-face confrontations. This function of parliamentary discourse has been described 
as a simultaneous “bonding and bounding” (Chilton 2004: 99-109). Party representatives 
“bond” by categorizing each other as belonging to the same parties in virtue of holding the 
same positions on issues, and at the same time “bound” by distancing themselves from each 
other, either directly or indirectly. Over time, framing over many individual discourse 
situations may lead to frames being permanently associated with certain parties. Thus, 
insofar as voters have access to parliamentary discourse, framing is a crucial component in 
allowing political parties to fulfill the function that Diamond and Gunther have called “issue 
structuring,” the “structuring [of] choices and alternatives along different issue dimensions” 
(Diamond and Gunther 2001: 8). 
It should also be noted that general sessions (Genel Kurullar) in the TGNA are public. 
Ostensibly, every word spoken during a general session is recorded by stenographers, and 
transcripts are made available on the Internet within a few days. The debates are broadcast 
live on television,8 and newspapers regularly report on statements made during sessions. 
Most importantly, this public dimension seems to be highly salient in the minds of 
parliamentarians.9 Many of the speeches made are only tangentially concerned with arguing 
                                                
8 There has been live television broadcasting of the TGNA sessions since 10 December 1994, on the 
channel TRT 3.  
9 An event that occurred in the TGNA on 5 October 2005 is illustrative of the importance some 
representatives place on the public relations dimension of parliamentary discourse. During a speech 
by the RPP’s Onur Öymen regarding the framework for EU membership negotiations, a member of 
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for or against a proposed amendment; some are primarily attacks on the behavior of other 
parties in the past, and yet others are simply ceremonial, self-congratulatory talks. Several of 
them are conducted after an amendment has been passed, and thus are not at all concerned 
with convincing other MPs in order to pass a proposal. At least for the TGNA, then, one may 
speak of both “discussion and showcase parliamentarianism” (Burkhardt 1995); the one does 
not exclude the other. 
This image-building dimension of parliamentary discourse also rests on the assumption that 
MPs in the TGNA speak on behalf of their parties more than on behalf of anything else. It 
must be noted that parliamentarians in general are subject to several sets of role-orientations, 
some of which may be in conflict. “Politicians, MPs, ministers speak as unique persons and 
thus may embody many political roles at the same time, such as party members, 
representatives, or members of the opposition” (van Dijk 2000b: 24). The relative 
importance of these roles can be expected to vary from one national assembly to another. In 
the TGNA, in-depth studies have suggested that MPs, when speaking and voting, are bound 
by their party group orientation more than anything else (Massicard 2005). Parliamentarians 
are largely dependent on their superiors in the party for advancement; in addition, in many 
cases, speeches on behalf of party groups must be approved in advance by the group 
leadership. Thus, although MPs certainly inject a measure of their own style when 
expressing their opinions, they can be expected to represent the overall views and attitudes 
of their parties. 
However, precisely because MPs are oriented toward their party affiliations, the position of 
their parties in relation to the government contributes toward determining the pragmatic 
orientation of each speech (Aslan-Akman 2005). Thus, for example, proposals tend to be 
presented by parties in government, and plenary questions regarding the proposals are 
presented by members of opposition parties (Massicard 2005: §48). As will become evident 
in chapter 5, the extent to which parties contrast themselves with other parties is also 
determined by such factors as the state of a coalition government, the time remaining before 
                                                                                                                                                 
the RPP became aware that live broadcasting had stopped. Members of the RPP asked that the 
session be halted until broadcasting was resumed. When a break was not forthcoming, the leader of 
the RPP’s party group angrily stated that a “hidden hand” had cut off the people’s access to the 
RPP’s speeches, and demanded that the missing segments be broadcast after the session was over 
(“Açıkça bir gizli el CHP’nin sesini kısmıştır”). (See Cumhuriyet, "Muhalefetin sesi 'teknik arızaya' 
takıldı!" 2005; TBMM 2005: 22-25). 
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the next election, and the like. Because such contextual conditions can be expected to affect 
the distribution of themes in parliamentary discourse, they must be taken into account when 
interpreting the results of the analysis.  
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3. Methodological considerations 
In this study, a version of content analysis has been used. Content analysis may be defined 
as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts […] to the 
contexts of their use” (Krippendorff 2004: 18). A stated goal of content analysis is thus to 
address two criteria that a scientific method is expected to ensure: reliability and validity. 
Put simply, reliability concerns random error, or error produced as a result of randomness or 
inaccuracy in measuring procedures. A measurement method is unreliable if it leads to a 
high degree of variation among measurements. Lack of reliability is problematic because it 
violates the scientific tenets of replicability and intersubjectivity. Thus, problems of 
reliability may occur either between different researchers working on the same material, or 
between analyses conducted at different points in time. Validity, on the other hand, refers to 
nonrandom error, or error produced as a result of errors in the conceptual and logical 
structure underlying a research procedure. Validity thus concerns the connection between the 
conceptual apparatus used to interpret the data and justify the method of analysis, and that 
method itself. A measurement method may be highly reliable if it leads to the same result 
across several measurements, but may nevertheless be invalid if it measures the wrong 
phenomenon. Conversely, a method may measure theoretically relevant and valid 
phenomena, but may be of little scientific value if the results are not reproducible.  
The proper way to ensure reliability and validity in text analysis is a matter of some dispute. 
According to Stone, “any systematic thematic text analysis risks alarming those who worry 
whether it can do justice to a text’s meaning” (Stone 1997: 37). This is particularly true 
when an analysis requires quantification, as is the case in this study. Converting words into 
numbers involves stripping them of context. This is not unique to text analysis – quantitative 
research is always preceded by a process of abstraction wherein real-life phenomena are 
“disembodied” from their contexts and converted to uniform “cases” (or ‘N’s) (Ragin 1987). 
In some research, particularly that which stays true to a nomothetic-deductive framework, 
this is often an inevitable and accepted consequence, and the loss of contextual factors may 
be treated as a matter of controlling variables. In the analysis of meaning-bearing material, 
however, what is lost when units are taken out of their contexts may be precisely what the 
analysis is supposed to measure. Put simply, the meaning of a word, phrase, or sentence, 
may depend on factors outside it – the co-text (text-internal context), the concrete situation 
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in which it has been produced, or characteristics of its wider social context. If these 
characteristics are not taken into account during the conversion process, a quantitative 
analysis, though highly reliable, may ultimately measure the wrong phenomenon. Thus, “in 
the pursuit of high reliability, validity tends to get lost” (Krippendorff 2004: 213).  
On the other hand, although qualitative, holistic reading methods may capture many aspects 
of a text’s meaning, they are also prone to subjective interference. Precisely because texts are 
context-dependent, the meanings they produce may vary depending on aspects of the 
reader’s background and predispositions. Thus, unless clear sampling and evaluation 
procedures are defined, serious bias may result. In testing a hypothesis, one may, in effect, 
find only what one is looking for. Thus, in the pursuit of validity, replicability and 
intersubjectivity can easily be lost. 
An important aim in this study has been to ensure that both reliability and validity criteria are 
met by the analysis. To this end, a version of content analysis has been chosen that combines 
quantitative and qualitative procedures.  
The most important procedure in this regard is the definition of recording units. A recording 
unit is any observable meaning-bearing unit that is “distinguished for separate description, 
transcription, recording, or coding” by the content analyst (Krippendorff 2004: 99). A 
recording unit may thus be any textual segment ranging in size from a single word to an 
entire text.  
In general, smaller recording units can be expected to yield more reliable codings (Ibid.: 
100). Words or phrases have a relatively narrow range of possible interpretations, and 
therefore stand a greater chance of being assigned the same value by different analysts. 
Larger recording units, on the other hand, tend to include more information, and therefore 
capture more dimensions of a discourse sample. This makes larger recording units more 
valid, but also more susceptible to subjective interference.  
There is thus always a tradeoff between reliability and validity involved in delimiting the 
recording units of a content analysis. For that reason, we will here conduct the analysis on 
two levels, and record units of two different sizes. The rationale behind this is that a 
combination of procedures may ameliorate the weaknesses arising from the tradeoff between 
validity and reliability (Ibid.). By explicating each step of the analysis, performing multiple 
analyses of the same text, and comparing and interpreting the results against each other, the 
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weaknesses of each level of analysis can be countered by the strength of the other. We will 
refer to these two levels as theme analysis and argument analysis. 
In addition defining two sets of recording units, each level of recording will be assigned its 
own level of context units. A context unit is a text-internal unit that delimits the scope of co-
text used for determining the meaning of each recording unit. Defining a context unit can be 
an important factor in enhancing reliability if a recording unit, in order to be unequivocally 
assigned to one category in the coding scheme, must be related to other features of the text in 
which it appears. Thus, for example, if a word in a given language has more than one 
semantic value, the information required in order to determine the precise value of an 
occurrence of it may in some cases be found within the sentence in which it appears. Context 
units thus “set limits on the information to be considered in the description of recording 
units” (Krippendorff 2004: 101). In addition, context units may enhance the validity of the 
recording units, by making their interpretation dependent on wider aspects of the discourse 
in which they appears. Context units thus provide a controlled and relatively replicable way 
of approximating the richness of holistic reading.  
3.1 Thematic analysis 
The lowest level of recording units used here are themes. A theme is admittedly a rather 
vague notion, and difficult to operationalize. In order to ensure replicability, all of the 
themes recorded will be operationalized as an extensional “dictionary” consisting of a pre-
defined selection of Turkish noun phrases (NPs). These are reproduced in chapter 5.1. Pre-
defining all of the recorded NPs ensures a replicability of nearly one hundred percent. In 
addition, the ideological significance of these themes in the context of Turkish party politics 
will be ensured by culling them from a range of secondary literature on the parties 
represented in the TGNA during the debates. As noted, chapter 4 is devoted to 
contextualizing these themes, and explaining their relation to the Turkish party system.  
In addition to ensuring reliability, using NPs as recording units has the advantage of 
allowing us to make finer distinctions between themes belonging to the same frame. Thus, 
instead of grouping all the themes predefined as belonging to the center-periphery frame on 
one variable, a distinction can be made between smaller groups of themes that can be 
expected to co-occur based on topical relevance. When analyzing the quantitative results, 
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this may provide clues as to what specific aspects of an issue a party has emphasized the 
most, and may also uncover emphases that cross the center-periphery/universalist divide. 
Thus, in devising the coding dictionary for the theme analysis, the center-periphery and 
universalist dimensions have each been divided into several clusters of themes that are 
recorded separately. 
Because the NPs at this level are pre-defined, they can in most cases be recorded without 
recourse to context units. The only exception to this is where ellipsis occurs. Because an NP 
is a syntactically defined unit, it may consist of more than one word. In many cases, during a 
speech, an NP already mentioned will be referred back to, using only one of its constituent 
words. Thus, for example, the English NP context units, if mentioned once, can be referred 
to again as these units. When this occurs in parliamentary discourse, the missing noun can 
most often be recovered from within the limits of a single argument. An argument is here 
taken to refer to a speech by an MP, from the point at which he10 is given permission to 
speak, until he is finished and leaves the podium for the next speaker. Thus, the context unit 
necessary for identifying the predefined themes in the text is here delimited to the argument 
in which it appears. This brings us to the second level of analysis, the argument analysis. 
3.2 Argument analysis 
As discussed earlier, issue framing refers to the salience of certain set of descriptive and 
evaluative considerations in discussing an issue. While using an extensional dictionary of 
NPs to guide the thematic coding procedure is a highly reliable measure of quantitative 
salience, some relevant information is lost in the process. For example, a high occurrence of 
an NP such as “secularism” (laiklik) does measure its thematic salience in quantitatively 
unequivocal terms, but indicates very little about the theme’s role in the overall 
communicative situation. It does not, for example, reveal whether the representative is 
arguing against secularism or for it, quoting the speech of another representative, being 
sarcastic, or proffering a new interpretation of the concept. Thus, the thematic analysis 
would be relatively low in validity unless complemented by an analysis that takes into 
                                                
10 All of the speakers in the selected material are male. 
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account the cohesive textual structures in which the themes are embedded – in short, 
arguments. 
In what we will call the argument analysis, the units that function as context units for the 
theme analysis are treated as recording units in their own right. We thus end up with what 
Krippendorff (2004: 100) calls an “inclusion hierarchy,” the higher level enclosing the 
lower. On the level of arguments, each speech made by an MP is assigned one value on a 
binary center-periphery/universalist variable. By recording both themes and the arguments 
they are embedded in, a quantitative measure can be produced that is both highly reliable and 
valid in a theoretical and context-sensitive way. 
The argument analysis captures significantly more information than the thematic analysis. 
This can be expected to yield more valid results than the theme analysis. On the other hand, 
precisely because it involves taking account of more information, the argument analysis is 
also more susceptible to subjective interference. Like “theme,” “argument” carries 
connotations that are not easily operationalized. Moreover, because parliamentary discourse, 
as discussed earlier, fulfills many functions, arguments are also liable to be interpreted in 
different ways. Some arguments may be quite long, and encompass many of the themes 
included in the thematic analysis, sometimes from both the center-periphery and universalist 
variables. Determining which of the two values an argument should be assigned to may 
therefore involve a certain amount of discretion. 
However, some basic guidelines can be constructed. First, because we have defined frames 
as consisting of both descriptive and normative elements, when analyzing such arguments 
for frames, we are only interested in disclosing the criteria on which party representatives 
support or oppose legal amendments. Hence, a speech regarding a particular amendment 
may be recorded as “universalist” regardless of whether the representative opposes or 
supports it. The actual positions taken on the legal amendments are of secondary importance; 
what is of interest to us is why he opposes or supports it.  
This is an important consideration. If we were to a priori define support for an amendment 
belonging to the NPAA as universalist, we would be implying that the amendment in itself is 
universalist, or that the only way to support it is by framing it in universalist terms. This 
would not only involve a great amount of normative assumptions, it would also require a 
priori differentiating between legislative proposals that fulfill universalist criteria and those 
that do not. The latter would be highly impractical and inevitably rather haphazard, as 
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legislative amendments often involve merely adding, removing, or changing one or two 
words.  
Beyond this, some clues for interpreting the arguments can be inferred from the largely tacit 
compositional rules that govern the structure of discourse in the TGNA. These are not very 
different from those governing formal English discourse. Typically, an argument starts by 
the speaker introducing himself, and informing the audience why, and in whose name, he is 
going to speak. This is followed by a recollection and listing of a variety of considerations 
that the representative feels should be brought to bear on the issue. This is usually done by a 
combination of narration and appeal to legal or normative themes. The narrative component 
recalls past events, often intertwining legislative history with societal events and 
developments. Lastly, a peroration is usually signaled by a “therefore” or “in this light” 
(dolayısıyla, etc.), or a topical return to the amendment being debated. This last part is of 
particular importance for determining how to code an argument. In summing up the gist of 
an argument, an MP usually alludes to those themes that he finds most important for 
deciding on whether to support or oppose a proposal. These themes thus provide important 
clues for placing the argument on the center-periphery/universalist variable. 
In cases where this structure is not upheld, the analysis must rely on less formalizable rules. 
In some cases, themes that are used in an argument may be indirectly referred to through 
oblique phrases such as “this danger,” “these rights,” and the like. Within the limits of a 
single argument, the precise theme referred to may therefore be unclear. However, due to the 
quasi-dialogical structure of parliamentary debates, these themes can almost always be 
recovered from some preceding argument. Thus, the position of an argument in the entire 
parliamentary session may be a crucial factor in determining what considerations an MP is 
mentioning. Therefore, in the argument analysis, we take the parliamentary session in which 
it appears as the context unit.  
Finally, the results of the argument analysis must be compared to the results of the thematic 
analysis. Taken alone, the theme analysis and argument analysis would have serious flaws. 
Only by comparing and contrasting their results with each other, and interpreting them 
against the background of the entire parliamentary session, can a complete and reliable 
image of framing emerge.  
 24 
3.3 Sampling 
The texts that serve as the basis for the empirical analysis of this study have been selected 
because of their topicality. Within the universe of Turkish parliamentary debates, only those 
sessions during which the six first harmonization packages of the NPAA were explicitly 
discussed and voted over have been selected.11 Here, “explicitly discussed” means that the 
packages, in whole or in part, appear on the officially announced list of issues to be 
discussed during the session. This list appears at he beginning of every transcript.12 On the 
same criteria, a further reduction has been made within the sessions to only include those 
segments where speeches pertaining to the packages are addressed. Speeches and arguments 
on other topics made during the same sessions have been excluded. This has left us with a 
material of approximately 140,000 words.13 
Further, it should be noted that no distinction has been made between passages where the 
speaker is announced to be speaking on behalf of a party group (grup adına), those where 
the speaker is announced to be speaking on his or her own behalf (şahsi adına), and those 
where neither option is announced.  
All methods have their limitations, and this one is no exception. First, the fact that the 
content analysis used here is a quantitative comparison of party discourse implies that its 
validity is strengthened the larger the number of text samples it includes. In this case, the 
sample size is not large enough to ensure significance in a strict statistical sense. However, 
this is to some extent a limitation imposed by the nature of meaningful data itself. As the 
next chapter demonstrates, the center-periphery and universalist dimensions have been 
chosen precisely because they pertain to the fundamental issues that the NPAA implicates. If 
the analysis were to include a randomly sampled selection of parliamentary debates, it is 
likely that a majority of the themes broached would be of a much more technical character, 
                                                
11 All of the transcripts have been retrieved from the TGNA’s web site (http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/). 
These are listed under References at the end of this thesis.  
12 The head of transcripts of general sessions in the TGNA always include an agenda for the session. 
The legislative proposals that are covered in this study are listed under the header “Kanun Tasarı ve 
Teklifleriyle Komisyonlardan Gelen Diğer İşler.”  
13 The breakdown in terms of parties is as follows: JDP: 28,189; MLP: 8,786; DLP: 15,960; TPP: 
16,490; NAP: 18,003; RPP: 19,578; FP: 33,083. 
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and would have little to do with issues such as those raised by the NPAA. Thus, to some 
extent, statistical validity must be sacrificed for theoretical validity.  
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4. Center-Periphery and Universalism: Themes in 
Turkish Party Politics 
4.1 Center-periphery and universalism 
The most well-known exponent of the center-periphery schema in social science is Edward 
Shils (1975). For Shils, “center” is a metaphor meant to capture the fact that the cultural and 
ideological value system of a society’s state-building elite often becomes that society’s 
dominant form of legitimating collectively binding decisions. Oppositional value systems 
thus become relegated to the “periphery.” As modernization progresses, multiple 
confrontations between various peripheral forces and the center have in some cases, notably 
in Western Europe, led to a gradual incorporation of the periphery into the center, enabling 
the emergence of multidimensional politics (cf. Rokkan 1968). This process has also, to 
varying degrees, been attended by a rationalization and de-politicization of central state 
institutions, in particular the bureaucracy and Army (Weber 1978).  
In Turkey, however, it has been argued that the centralist state tradition of the Ottoman 
Empire enabled the state-builders of the Republic of Turkey to perpetuate the center’s hold 
over the periphery throughout the period in which the state was modernized (Heper 1985; 
Mardin 1973). Instead of becoming instruments for implementing political decisions, the 
bureaucracy and Army maintained a self-image as keepers of a moral order, defined by 
allegiance to Western, “scientific” principles. The flipside of this self-image is that it led to 
the suppression of political movements based on identities other than that of the urban, 
moderately Sunni Muslim, Turk. Alevis, Kurds, conservative Muslims, and a number of 
other identities thus became relegated to the “periphery” of Turkish politics.  
During the transition to electoral democracy, the center-periphery division was reproduced in 
the party system (Karpat 1959). The result became what Heper has called a “moderately 
transcendental polity,” in which the “locus of the state,” formerly institutionalized in the 
bureaucracy and Army, in addition came to be represented by one political party among 
several others (Heper 1985: 9). Instead of solely representing the interests of specific groups, 
that party fashioned itself as the representative of the entire nation, defined as a moral 
community whose telos was the realization of Atatürk’s principles. Party politics henceforth 
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came to revolve around the right to interpret and define the substance of politics itself. The 
center, aligned with the Army and bureaucracy, tended to emphasize a secularist, state-
centered form of Kemalism, in which the public expression of religion and ethnic identity 
were considered detrimental to national unity. The periphery, in turn, represented a variety of 
particularist orientations, and consequently either rejected Kemalism completely, or 
attempted to interpret its basic tenets in a more liberal fashion. Although the introduction of 
competitive politics has gradually allowed other dimensions to emerge, notably the left-right 
cleavage familiar from European party politics, the prevalence of culturally and religiously 
based opposition to the basic features of the regime ideology has continued to be a 
significant factor in determining voting behavior and the tone of inter-party competition 
(Çarkoğlu 1998: 139-148; Ergüder and Hoffebert 1987; Özbudun 1980; Özcan 2000; Sayarı 
1978). Thus, although it is possible, today, to map Turkish parties along a multidimensional 
left-right division (cf. Özbudun 2006; Türsan 2004: 100-2, 197-8), the center-periphery 
division has showed a remarkable ability to subsume under it new issues and themes.  
In spite of this, two factors make the center-periphery division less useful in mapping 
discursive orientations on questions arising from the EU’s accession acquis. One is a 
practical problem, arising from the nature of public political discourse in Turkey. As Avcı 
and Çarkoğlu note, while the center-periphery paradigm “clearly differentiates Turkish 
parties,” the periphery is in fact a heterogeneous dimension, consisting of a multitude of 
socio-economic, ethnic, and religious groups (Avcı and Çarkoğlu 2002: 126). The dominant 
part in setting the agenda of political discourse has been the center parties, who, by 
consistently excluding openly peripheral elements, have made the discursive manifestation 
of the cleavage revolve around centrist concerns. In official discourse such as party 
manifestos and parliamentary debates, therefore, the center-periphery division tends to 
collapse into one group of themes, with parties differing mainly in their more or less explicit 
attempts at re-interpreting centrist thematics. Thus, for example, the parties associated with 
the National Outlook movement have been noted for developing two separate discourses, 
one “unofficial,” emphasizing Islam, the other “official,” often co-opting Kemalist thematics 
(White 2002; Yıldız 2003: 193-4). This may explain why, for all practical purposes, the 
periphery has been seen as “the complement of the centre” (Çarkoğlu 1998: 133).  
This brings us to the other factor. Çarkoğlu (1998), relying on quantitative content analyses 
of Turkish party manifestos, finds that a third dimension, which he calls universalist, has 
emerged as a competitor to the center-periphery dichotomy. He thus empirically confirms 
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what has been claimed by several researchers (Gülalp 2001; Rumford 2000; 2002). 
Thematically, he finds this dimension to revolve around rights, democratization, and civil 
society. As against the center-periphery dimension, which emphasizes the conflictual 
dimensions of inter-party competition, the universalist dimension emphasizes 
“generalizable” principles one would expect to promote consensus. It is thus largely co-
extensive with the thematics underlying the political criteria of the EU’s accession acquis. 
Interestingly, he also finds that some of the parties most closely resembling a typical party of 
the periphery, such as the Islamist Welfare Party, have been those that have emphasized the 
universalist frame the most (Ibid.: 136). 
An interesting question arising out of these observations, then, is to what extent the parties 
represented in the TGNA during the debates on the legal amendments of the NPAA have 
drawn on the universalist frame. On the one hand, because the amendments are essentially 
democratizing measures, one would expect an emphasis on universalist thematics and 
arguments. On the other hand, it is clear that the universalist dimension is not coextensive 
with a positive stance on the question of EU membership. Moreover, because parties in 
parliament have a need to differentiate themselves, one might also expect them to draw on 
themes associated with the more antagonistic center-periphery frame. 
In order to investigate these questions, the center-periphery and universalist frames will be 
operationalized as two sets of themes and two argument values. These will then be applied to 
the discourse of the political parties represented in the TGNA during the debates on the 
NPAA. In order to contextualize these dimensions and the following analysis in terms of 
Turkish party politics, the remainder of this chapter addresses two questions:  
1) How have the seven political parties addressed in this thesis historically positioned 
themselves in the center-periphery cleavage, and to what extent have they adopted more 
universalist thematics? 
2) What are the themes that have historically been associated with the center-periphery and 
universalist dimensions in the Turkish party system?  
4.1.1 The Republican People’s Party 
In the Turkish party system, the salience of the center-periphery division can be traced back 
to the fact that Turkey’s oldest party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
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Partisi, RPP), is popularly perceived to be a direct heir of the resistance movement, and later 
republican state cadre, centered on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.14 Although a nominally separate 
party was allowed to form in 1924, the RPP remained in government until 1950, in what was 
a de facto authoritarian one-party state. Therefore, during the RPP’s first 26 years of 
existence, it was virtually synonymous with the state, and was in a position to formulate its 
ideology and the state ideology as one.  
The RPP emblem’s six arrows symbolize the six founding principles of the Turkish 
Republic, which were also included in the Turkish Constitution in 1937: republicanism, 
statism,15 populism, nationalism, secularism, and reformism. Although none of these were 
ever given exact definitions, subsequent developments led them to be interpreted in an 
authoritarian and elitist fashion. In particular, “secularism” (laiklik)16 was implemented 
through a series of aggressive reforms designed to disassociate Turkish society from its 
historical roots in the Islamic world. In addition to secularizing the legal system, religious 
orders (tarikats) were forbidden, “Western” dress codes were enforced, the Latin alphabet 
was adopted, and the vocabulary used in public discourse was drastically altered. These 
attacks on popular religion were probably enough to alienate large portions of the public 
from the RPP; however, for the party, its measures were justified by recourse to other 
principles. The notion of “populism” (halkçılık) held by the RPP was heavily indebted to 
Durkheim’s organicist view of society, as well as ideas from Tarde, LeBon, and Tönnies 
(Spencer 1958). Combined with “statism” (devletçilik) and “reformism” (inkilapçılık), it 
emerged as a tendency to conceive of social change as state-led projects, “plans for change 
originating among a cohesive group of social ‘engineers’” (Mardin 1997: 65), the ultimate 
aim of which were to bring Turkey up to date with Western standards of civilization. 
                                                
14 The actual degree of continuity between the RPP and the “Society for the Defence of Rights” 
(Mudafaa-I Hukuk Grubu), a nationalist alliance founded in 1919 with the purpose of defending the 
unity of Turkish territories, is less clear. However, for a long time after the Republic was formed, 
Turkish historiography reflected the historical narrative of Atatürk’s famous “Speech” from 1927 
(Nutuk), in which he presented the RPP as a direct continuation of the Society (Karpat 1991: 45-51; 
Zürcher 1998: 182-3). This narrative is still upheld by the RPP (CHP 2006). 
15 “Statism” is sometimes referred to in the literature as “étatism.” 
16 It has been argued that laiklik would be more accurately translated with the French word from 
which it was borrowed, laicité, reflecting the fact that the Kemalist policy towards Islam has been 
more in the nature of co-opting and controlling it than separating it from politics (Davison 2003). I 
nevertheless use “secularism” here for the sake of neatness. 
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Because the primary goal of these projects was to create a modern, unified nation, the RPP 
could claim to represent the whole of Turkey, regardless of class, ethnicity, or creed.  
The latter claim became difficult to uphold when the RPP was ousted from government by 
the Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi, DP) in the first free elections in 1950.17 Although the 
program of the DP was initially very similar to that of the RPP, it soon came to differ on a 
number of matters, notably in its liberal interpretation of “secularism,” and its rural, and 
more religiously conservative, constituency (Ahmad 1977: 13-15; Eroğul 1990). In addition, 
it differed from the RPP in its clientilistic politics, a strategy that effectively enabled it to 
build a following across several groupings in the heterogeneous periphery. The interaction 
between the RPP and the DP thus set the tone for a pattern of party competition, which, 
although complicated by various factors, was to continue for several decades.  
The DP remained in power throughout the 1950s. After increasing its hold on Parliament in 
the 1954 elections, it started pursuing irresponsible economic policies, and began developing 
its hold on government into an authoritarian regime centered on the quasi-religious charisma 
of its leader (Sunar 1986). This led to the first military coup in 1960, which was backed by 
the RPP. Although the DP was closed after the coup, the center-periphery cleavage 
continued throughout the 60s and 70s, with the RPP as the main representative of the center, 
and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, JP) essentially continuing the tradition of the DP. 
During the seventies, several new parties emerged, some representing radical leftist and 
rightist tendencies, but the overall impact of the left-right divide was absorbed by the RPP 
and the JP, respectively (Tachau 1991: 99-100, 142; Türsan 2004: 106-114). Toward the end 
of the seventies, however, increasing political violence among the smaller fractions 
eventually became so problematic that the Army decided to intervene again.  
The 1980 coup was an event that marked a decisive break in the RPP’s tacit alliance with the 
Army. With the coup, the Army wanted to refashion the party system through legal 
engineering, and to a large extent it seems to have succeeded. All the existing political 
parties were dissolved, and their leaders were prohibited from participating in politics. In 
addition, to prevent fragmentation, a national 10% threshold was established. Since the RPP 
was allowed to re-open in 1993, it has struggled to regain its former place in the party 
                                                
17 The first elections were held in 1946, but are widely held to have been manipulated, thus making 
1950 the year of the first realistically free elections (Zürcher 1998: 222). 
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system. Due to its association with Atatürk, it is still perceived by many as being the most 
authoritative party representative of Kemalism. It has kept the six arrows in its party 
emblem, but has continued to adjust its interpretation of them to changing circumstances. 
The question facing it now is whether these adjustments will be adequate. The RPP was not 
represented in the TGNA after the 1999 elections, falling below the national threshold for 
the first time since the founding of the Republic. It was thus not represented when the first 
three harmonization packages of the NPAA were passed. However, following a severe 
economic crisis in 2001 and a corruption scandal that implicated members of it main rival on 
the center-left, the Democratic Left Party, it became the sole opposition party to the JDP in 
the 2002 elections, and participated in the debates on the fourth and fifth legislative packages 
with 152 MPs.18  
4.1.2 The Democratic Left Party 
The Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DLP) was founded in 1985 as a 
competitor to the Social Democratic Party. Like the latter, the DLP was initially seen by 
many as a placeholder for the RPP while the latter was outlawed. During its early years of 
existence, it was controlled behind the scenes by Bülent Ecevit, the Secretary-General of the 
former RPP, with his wife, Rahşan Ecevit, functioning as the official leader. After the RPP 
was allowed to regroup in 1993, the DLP and the RPP have followed very similar policies, 
competition between the two parties upheld mainly as a result of the strong personalities of 
their respective leaders. On economic issues, the DLP has tried to fashion itself as a party to 
the left of the RPP, but on political issues pertaining to national sovereignty, it has usually 
been placed slightly to the right (Özbudun 2001: 258). In terms of center-periphery themes, 
therefore, the DLP and RPP are very similar. The DLP is also similar to the RPP of old in 
that it has an extremely centralized intra-party organization, and relies to a great extent on 
the opinions and behavior of its leader (Kınıklıoğlu 2002).  
Like the RPP, then, the DLP has been a true “center” party, emphasizing many of the classic 
Kemalist issues: state-controlled economy, secularism, appeals to patriotism, and support for 
the military. In 1999, it entered government for the first time, in a coalition with the extreme-
                                                
18 The number of RPP MPs after the elections was originally 178, but declined to 152 between 
November 2002 and January 2003 due to resignations and transfers.  
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right Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the Motherland Party (MLP). Like the NAP, it was 
elected on a nationalistic, state-centered platform, and promised to clamp down on the 
Kurdish militants that had been engaging the army in the Southeast. It fulfilled these 
expectations when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested during the DLP’s 
tenure in government in 1999. While in Parliament, the DLP participated in debating and 
enacting the first to the third legislative package of the NPAA with 119 representatives.19 
4.1.3 The Nationalist Action Party  
The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, NAP) was founded under the name 
Republican Peasants National Party in 1958. It was a marginal party until after the 1960 
coup, when Alparslan Türkeş, one of the coup’s main organizers, joined it, and changed its 
name to the Nationalist Action Party. While a member of the post-coup ruling council (the 
National Unity Council), Türkeş had been a part of the faction that favored changing the 
constitution to drastically lessen the influence of political parties. In the NAP, this 
authoritarian streak developed into what came to be known as “idealism” (ülkücülük), a 
notion that entailed subservience to the state above all. During the seventies, in particular, 
this manifested itself in the militant activities of the “idealist hearths” (Ülkü Ocakları), anti-
communist youth organizations with militant offshoots.  
While the NAP has its roots in the Army, traditionally the defender of the “center’s” values, 
its willingness to embrace illegal activities has been one of the main factors serving to 
differentiate the NAP’s brand of nationalism from that of the Kemalism of the RPP and 
DLP. It has, in a sense, fought for the state, in spite of the state. Like the RPP, the 1980 coup 
came as a shock to the NAP, which up until then had seen itself as serving the interests of 
the state against its enemies. To add to the confusion, after it was refounded in 1983, a 
religious dimension was added to its ethnic and racial mythology concerning Turkish 
nationhood, resulting in a concept called the “Islam-Turk synthesis” (Türk-İslam Sentezi). 
This implied a break with the secularist tradition of the officer corps in which Türkeş had his 
roots, and enabled the party to fathom a larger part of the right, in particular constituencies 
                                                
19 Note, however, that a group of 58 representatives left the DLP on 21 July 2002, following a 
leadership crisis. These formed the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP), and participated 
as such during the third debate. After the 2002 elections, the YTP merged with the RPP. In this 
thesis, YTP representatives have been treated as belonging to the DLP. 
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that had traditionally voted for the “peripheral” Justice Party and Motherland Party (Akgün 
2002), and the Islamist Felicity Party (Yavuz 2002). During the nineties, however, its 
emphasis on support for the Army was again strengthened, when Kurdish terrorism once 
more became an issue. Although the NAP’s interpretation on the racial belongingness of 
Kurds has varied throughout its history, during the 90s, in particular, it tended to define them 
in negative terms, as enemies of what became an increasingly securitized state ideal (Bora 
and Can 2004: 90-101). Consequently, much of its electoral discourse prior to the 1999 
election was predicated on supporting the state and military in fighting Kurdish insurgents in 
the Southeast. 
In terms of the center-periphery cleavage, then, the NAP has a mixed history. It has 
consistently branded itself as a party of the center, supporting the state and Army above all; 
at the same time, it has succeeded in alienating much of the traditional center elite through 
its extremism and occasional flirting with Islam (Öniş 2003b). After Devlet Bahçeli became 
Secretary-General, it has softened its image, in particular downplaying the role of “cultural” 
nationalism in favor of a “civic” nationalism, where devotion to Turkey as a community 
takes precedence (Çınar and Arıkan 2002: 36). It succeeded in this to such an extent that it 
was able to enter government coalition with the DLP and TPP in 1999, participating as a 
government party in the debates on the first to the third harmonization packages of the 
NPAA with 126 MPs in parliament. It remains to be seen to what extent its recent 
moderation affected its discourse on the democratization measures of the NPAA.  
4.1.4 The Motherland Party  
Among the “periphery” parties, two parties continued the tradition of the DP and JP in the 
1980s and 90s, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, MLP) and the True Path Party 
(Doğru Yol Partisi, TPP). The Motherland Party was one of three parties that were allowed 
to participate in the 1983 elections. It was the only one that was not associated with the 
military junta, and it was also the most successful of the three. Like the JP, and the DP 
before it, the MLP was able to forge a broad coalition of segments belonging to various 
“peripheries.” Its leader, Turgut Özal, was formerly a member of the JP, and had later been a 
member of Necmettin Erbakan’s pro-Islamist National Salvation Party. In addition, he had 
experience from the financial sector, having worked for the World Bank and the Sabancı 
Corporation. This combination gave him credibility both with the economically liberal 
middle class and with the religious-conservative segments. Although the MLP’s support 
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base came primarily from that of the old JP, it also drew members and voters from the 
former NAP and RPP through its insistence on representing “four inclinations” at once: 
liberalism, religious conservatism, nationalism, and social democracy (Ergüder 1991: 155-
160).  
In terms of the center-periphery cleavage, then, the MLP essentially continued the peripheral 
DP and JP’s tradition. To a greater extent than the former parties, however, it downplayed 
the role of religion in its public discourse. By relying on the popular image of its leader as a 
pious Muslim to convey its essentially value-conservative attitude, it was able to justify its 
economic liberalization measures with an appeal to “universal” norms such as free enterprise 
and international cooperation (Çarkoğlu 1998: 144-46). Economically, it upheld the anti-
statist stance of the former large parties of the periphery, the DP and the JP, with their 
support for free market capitalism. After the 1999 elections, it was able to participate in 
government in coalition with the NAP and DLP, with 73 MPs in Parliament.  
4.1.5 The True Path Party  
The True Path Party was founded in 1983. Unlike the MLP, the TPP openly claimed to be 
the heir of the JP (Acar 1991: 188). Although its leader, Süleyman Demirel, did not have the 
economic credibility of Özal, the main themes of the TPP’s rhetoric were largely the same as 
that of the MLP: patriotism, value conservatism, and market capitalism. In addition, it 
espoused a simplified, “direct” democratic ideology, similar to that of the MLP, but with a 
stronger populist emphasis on the “national will” (milli irade), reminiscent of the DP and JP 
(Sakallıoğlu 1998: 149).  
Due to its similarity with the MLP, the TPP and the MLP have been called “feuding twins” 
(Çandar 1999). Much like the RPP and DLP, they are perceived as virtually 
indistinguishable, and as competitors rather than opponents, fighting to occupy the same 
place in the party system (Kalaycıoğlu 2002: 53). Their disagreements have consequently 
been determined by strategic positioning more than ideological differences. For example, 
while it was the main opposition party in Parliament in 1994-1995, the TPP opposed the 
Customs Union, in spite of its overall support for economic liberalization (Öniş 2003a: 18). 
During the 1995 election campaigns, its stance shifted completely, making membership in 
the Customs Union one of the principal themes of its election platform (Sakallıoğlu 2002: 
92-3).  
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The TPP was one of the largest parties during the 1999-2002 parliamentary term, when the 
first three harmonization packages were debated. In spite of having 83 representatives in 
parliament over the Motherland Party’s 73, however, the DLP and NAP preferred to form a 
coalition government with the latter. Once again, then, the TPP was in opposition, and was 
faced with the dilemma of upholding a liberal, pro-EU ideology while differentiating itself 
from the MLP.  
4.1.6 The Felicity Party 
Among the five largest parties in Parliament during the 1999-2002 term, the Felicity Party 
(Saadet Partisi, FP) comes closest to representing a typical party of the “periphery.” It was 
founded in 2001 by the “traditionalist” (gelenekçi) wing of the dissolved Virtue Party 
(Fazilet Partisi, VP), itself a continuation of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, WP) 
that was shut down by court order in 1998. After the 1980 coup, the Welfare Party became 
the Islamist-nationalist National Outlook movement’s political party. Led by Necmettin 
Erbakan, it became partner in a coalition government with the True Path Party in 1995, 
marking the culmination of the rise of Turkish Islamism. This led to a great amount of 
uncertainty regarding the future of Turkey’s relations with the EU. While the TPP was pro-
EU, it was widely known that Erbakan saw the EU as a Western imperialist ploy, and 
preferred strengthening the country’s ties with the Muslim world.20 Although the WP 
subdued its Islamist rhetoric while in government, in 1997, the Army saw fit to pressure it to 
such an extent that the coalition government was dissolved, in what quickly became known 
as the world’s first “postmodern coup” (Çandar 1997). 
Unlike the liberal wing of the VP, which we will return to shortly, the conservative wing that 
founded the FP has continued to espouse values associated with the National Outlook 
movement, including a skeptical attitude to Westernization. Like the WP, the FP’s official 
stance on EU membership is that while Turkey may benefit from democratic reform, it has 
no need to become a member of what the FP sees as a Western, essentially Christian club.21 
                                                
20 In a book written in 1975, Erbakan claims that the Common Market is “a Zionist ploy” (“Ortak 
Pazar bir siyonist oyundur”) designed to continue the economic colonization of Turkey begun by 
Western powers during the last century of the Ottoman Empire (Erbakan 1975: 248). 
21 See the Felicity Party’s party program (SP 2001: § V.4.2). Note that the statement “As the Felicity 
Party, we are against Turkish EU membership” (“Saadet Partisi olarak Türkiye’nin AB’ye üye 
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It primary constituency comes from conservative Muslims across socio-economic divides, 
although the upwardly mobile Muslim middle class has recently drifted toward the Justice 
and Development Party (Yeşilada 2002). Following the shutdown of the VP, many of its 
former members stayed in parliament and simply transferred to the FP. During the debates 
on the three first harmonization packages, it was represented by 47 MPs in opposition. 
4.1.7 Justice and Development Party  
The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, JDP) was founded in 2001 
with several prominent members of the “progressive” (yenilikçi) wing of the former VP 
among its leadership. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, formerly mayor of Istanbul for the WP, 
became the leader of the new party, with Abdullah Gül, who had served as secretary general 
of the WP, as deputy leader (Atacan 2005; Yeşilada 2002).22 The JDP also attracted 
members of Kurdish parties no longer in existence. In the 2002 general elections, helped by 
a 10% entry threshold, the JDP won a landslide victory over all other parties, and gained 363 
of 550 seats. This enabled it to form a one-party government, which, in terms of 
parliamentary representation, is the most powerful government since the ten-year era of the 
populist Democrat Party in the 1950s.  
The JDP has attracted the attention of researchers due to what many see as a fundamental 
paradox in its party ideology. Due to the fact that many of its most prominent members 
started their political careers in the National Outlook movement, it is routinely referred to in 
both media and academic literature as “pro-Islamist,” yet its party program, official 
publications, and emblems are devoid of references to Islam. The fact that the current JDP 
government has succeeded in speeding up the reforms required by EU conditionality and 
negotiated the commencement of membership talks, further cements the impression that the 
JDP leadership has either undergone a complete personal transformation, or is involved in 
dissimulation (takiyye). The question of whether or not Erdoğan’s personal transformation 
                                                                                                                                                 
olmasına karşıyız”) is not found in the English translation available at the party’s website, only in the 
Turkish. 
22 Other prominent members of the VP that joined the JDP were Bülent Arınç, Cemil Çiçek, 
Abdulkadir Aksu, and Ali Coşkun. 
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from a pro-sharia fundamentalist to a conservative democrat is sincere has been the subject 
of several studies (Çakır and Çalmuk 2001; Heper and Toktaş 2003).  
Whatever the reasons behind the founding of the JDP, the image it tries to project today lies 
closer to the Christian democratic parties of Western Europe than to its Islamist predecessors 
(Hale 2006). Its constituency has been shown to resemble to that of the MLP and TPP, with 
an emphasis on middle class business interests, and an implied rather than explicit 
conservative Muslim lifestyle (Çarkoğlu 2006; Coşar and Özman 2004). This has led some 
to conclude that it lies closer to the tradition of the Justice Party, Motherland Party, and True 
Path Party than to the Islamic Felicity Party (Özbudun 2006). Moreover, like the MLP, it has 
been quite open about the need to further define its identity, even going so far as to organize 
an international conference on the subject (cf. AKP 2004). The working title of its ideology, 
“conservative democracy,” has so far emphasized classic liberal themes in both economic 
and normative terms. Thus, in spite of its Islamist roots, the JDP might be the party that has 
succeeded most in superceding the center-periphery divide, and approximating the third, 
“universalist” dimension.  
4.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, although the center-periphery dimension seems to have declined in 
importance, several of its themes have persisted until quite recently. The center, represented 
by the RPP, DLP, and NAP, has continued to emphasize the classic Kemalist themes of 
secularism, state unity, state initiative, and national independence. In addition, it has 
increasingly turned its attention towards Kurdish separatist activities. The presently largest 
parties associated with the periphery, the TPP, MLP, and JDP, have continued to emphasize 
traditional values, respect for religion, and the importance of local initiative and will. The 
periphery, like the center, has become more fractionalized since the 1970s, several of its 
themes becoming embodied in separate parties. This has to some extent complicated the 
scheme, creating crosscutting cleavages where, for instance, the Islamist FP has in common 
with the state-loyal NAP an anti-Western rhetoric. Nevertheless, as before, the periphery 
continues to be defined as such by the center, which still brandishes its resolve to keep 
parties that openly represent political Islam and ethnic minorities from gaining influence.  
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The universalist dimension observed by Çarkoğlu (1998) seems to result from the fact that 
several parties have adopted accommodational attitudes on a series of key issues. A tendency 
can be observed across the center-periphery spectrum to adopt a conciliatory tone, and 
emphasize principled arguments for decentralization, strengthening civil society, and 
aligning the legal framework of politics with the norms expressed in international human 
rights agreements. These norms include freedom of speech and conscience, social and legal 
equality, and the creation of a more democratic and pluralist polity. This has increasingly 
turned attention away from themes associated with the center-periphery dimension.  
Taking these observations as a basis, I now turn to operationalizing the two dimensions, and 
apply them to the six parliamentary debates. 
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5. Analysis 
5.1 Coding dimensions 
As noted in chapter 3, in order to be replicable, the quantitative theme analysis relies to a 
great extent on the researcher’s ability to explicate every step of the analysis. Replicability 
will here be ensured by operationalizing the coding dimensions applied in the theme analysis 
as an extensional list of noun phrases. The argument analysis, as also discussed in chapter 3, 
is only operationalized as a binary center-periphery/universalist variable, and is therefore not 
reproduced here.  
In order to ensure validity, care has been taken to define each NP in a way that captures as 
much of their normative connotations as possible. This should also, as a consequence, lead to 
an approximate correlation between the two levels of analysis. Hence, the NPs listed are all 
identifiable as value-laden and contentious in the context of Turkish party politics. They are 
for the most part abstract concepts or legal entities with a highly symbolic character, which 
makes them natural points of reference in arguing a point. Thus, for example, “state” is only 
included if it occurs as part of one of the NP combinations listed: “unitary state,” “secular 
state,” “the state’s wholeness,” and the like. While this does not ensure a one hundred 
percent fit between the two levels of analysis, when combined, the theme and argument 
analyses should result in an adequate measurement of the existence of a frame.  
In addition, it should be noted that the list of Turkish NPs has been constructed so as to 
capture the widest possible range of phrases that express the same concept. Lexicogrammar 
frequently provides a wide variety of noun phrase combinations that express more or less the 
same concept. To capture as many occurrences of a concept as possible, in devising the 
coding scheme, each theme cluster has been operationalized as a set of NPs. In order to 
ensure replicability, although the list of NPs could be virtually endless, no further NPs than 
those listed have been coded. 
However, as discussed in chapter 3.1, the theme analysis does include NPs where one of the 
elements listed in the coding scheme can be unequivocally recovered from within its context 
unit. As noted, the context unit for the theme analysis is limited to the argument in which it 
occurs. Thus, for example, if the phrase “these rights” (bu haklar) occurs, it is only recorded 
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if it can be established without reasonable doubt that “these” functions as an endophoric 
reference to, for instance, the noun “human” (insan), occurring somewhere within the same 
argument. If such a noun cannot be recovered from the argument, the phrase is not recorded.  
One additional rule should be noted. In some cases, several recordable NPs occur within a 
larger NP. This occurs, for instance, where a combination of NPs is so common that is can 
be regarded has having achieved the status of a fixed expression. It also occurs in certain 
proper names, such as laws, treaties, or courts. In these cases, the NPs are only counted as 
belonging to the larger NP, and only if the larger unit is included in the coding scheme. 
Thus, for example, “basic rights and freedoms” (temel hak ve hürriyetler/ temel hak ve 
özgürlükler) is only recorded as one unit, despite the fact that it syntactically consists of two 
NPs that have been included as separate entries in the coding scheme. Similarly, “unitary 
state” is commonly expressed with the somewhat complicated expression “the undivisible 
unity of the state” (devletin bölünmez bütünlüğü) or the even more complicated “the 
undivisible wholeness of the state and its nation and community” (devletin ülkesi ve 
milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğü), both of which stem from the 1961 Constitution. Here, too, 
each expression has only been recorded once. In the proper name “Law on Fighting Terror” 
(Terörle Mücadele Yasası), however, “terror” has not been recorded, because it belongs to a 
proper name that is not listed in the coding scheme.  
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CENTER-PERIPHERY  
   
Theme cluster Noun phrases23 English cognates 
Secularism laiklik, laik devlet/ 
cumhuriyet, irtica 
secularism, the secular state/ 
republic, (religious) 
rectionarism 
Statism/ centralism üniter devlet, bölünmez 
devlet, devletin/ ülkenin/ 
milletin (bölünmez/ ülkesi 
ve milletiyle bölünmez) 
bütünlüğu/ birliği/ üniter 
yapısı, millî/ ulusal birlik, 
bölücülük, bölücü 
the unitary state, the state/ 
nation’s wholeness/ 
oneness/ unitary structure, 
national unity 
Kurdish separatism PKK, KADEK, Abdullah 
Öcalan, Öcalan, "Apo" 
PKK (The Kurdistan 
Worker's Party), KADEK 
(Kurdistan Democracy and 
Freedom Congress), 
Abdullah Öcalan (former 
leader of the PKK), "Apo" 
(popular nickname for 
Öcalan) 
Nationalism/ Anti-
internationalism 
Cumhuriyetin/ Türkiye’nin 
bağımsızlığı/ egemenliği, 
emperiyalism, sömürgecilik 
The Republic’s/ Turkey’s 
independence/ sovereignty, 
imperialism, colonialism 
Kemalism Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
Atatürk 
(Mustafa Kemal) Atatürk 
Security  ulusal/ milli/ kamu 
güvenlik/-ği, terör, terörist, 
terörizm, şehit, gazi 
national security, 
terror/terrorism, terrorist, 
(military) victims, (military) 
heroes 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Legend for the Turkish NPs: NPs are separated by commas. A slash denotes a facultative element 
where one or more of the elements must be present for the NP to be recorded. An element inside 
brackets is entirely facultative. Except for possessive and genitive endings, suffixes are not included 
in the list. 
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UNIVERSALIST   
   
Theme cluster Noun phrases English cognates 
International legal 
authorities, treaties, 
agreements, and norms 
uluslararası hukuk/ 
sözleşmeleri/ anlaşmaları/ 
taahhütler/ normlar, Avrupa 
İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi, 
Avrupa İnsan Hakları 
Sözleşmesi, İnsan Hakları 
(Evrensel) Beyannamesi/ 
Bildirgesi, Kopenhag 
Kriterleri 
International law/ treaties/ 
agreements/ contracts/ 
norms, The Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights, The European 
Convention on Human 
Rights, The European Court 
of Human Rights, the 
Copenhagen Criteria 
Civil society sivil toplum, sivil örgütler, 
sivil toplum örgütleri, 
örgütlenme özgürlüğü/ 
hürriyeti 
civil society, civic 
organizations, freedom to 
organize 
Legality hukuk/-ğun üstünlüğü/ 
egemenliği, hukuk devleti 
sovereignty of law, 
constitutional state 
(Rechtstaat) 
Rights insan hakları, 
bireyin/bireysel haklar, 
temel/ evrensel haklar/ 
özgürlükler/ hürriyetler, 
ifade/ söz/ düşünce/ kanaat/ 
vicdan/ fikir özgürlüğü/ 
hürriyeti, ifade etme hakkı, 
düşünceyi açıklama 
özgürlüğü 
human rights, freedom of 
speech, freedom of thought, 
freedom of conscience/ 
opinion, individual rights, 
basic/ universal rights 
Democracy  demokrasi, 
demokratikleşme 
democracy, democratization 
Social equality eşitlik, eşitlsizik, eşit haklar equality, inequality, equal 
rights 
Pluralism dinî/ dinsel/ etnik 
çoğulculuk 
religious/ ethnic pluralism 
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5.2 Quantitative results 
The results of the thematic analysis are here summarized for each party. 
Center-periphery         
 RPP DLP24 NAP TPP MLP FP JDP Totals 
Secularism 5 3 4 2 0 1 2 17 
Statism/ centralism 10 29 12 15 2 13 21 102 
Kurdish separatism 0 1 32 9 0 3 4 49 
Anti-
internationalism 14 6 6 1 0 2 1 30 
Kemalism 7 5 12 1 5 3 1 34 
Security 7 30 50 10 4 7 13 121 
         
Total Center- 
periphery 43 74 116 38 11 29 42 353 
         
         
          
Universalism                 
 RPP DLP NAP TPP MLP FP JDP Totals 
International 
treaties/agreements 67 29 38 29 92 44 102 401 
Civil Society 3 5 0 5 11 28 12 64 
Legality 22 13 1 2 1 27 12 78 
Rights 45 32 20 53 48 56 53 307 
Democracy 14 20 10 77 10 81 59 271 
Social equality 2 2 0 0 0 0 11 15 
Pluralism 6 2 0 1 0 0 3 12 
          
Total Universalism 159 103 69 167 162 236 252 1148 
           
         
Percentages RPP DLP NAP TPP MLP FP JDP Totals 
           
Total 202 177 185 205 173 265 294 1501 
Center/periphery % 21.29 41.81 62.70 18.54 6.36 10.94 14.29 23.52 
Universalism % 78.71 58.19 37.30 81.46 93.64 89.06 85.71 76.48 
 
                                                
24 As noted in chapter 4, the column for the Democratic Left Party (DLP) also includes the New 
Turkey Party (NTP). 
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As the percentages show, the dominant dimension in terms of theme salience is the 
universalist, with 1148 units, or 76.48 percent, out of a total of 1501 recorded units. At the 
most general level, then, the expectation that the legal amendments would be framed in 
terms of universalist themes has been confirmed. In particular, it seems, the theme cluster 
‘International treaties/ agreements,’ encompassing both the agreements themselves, the legal 
norms perceived to underlie them, and the authorities that implement them, has been a topic 
of discussion, with the majority of units within the universalist dimension. The international 
context of the amendments, and their legal genealogy in terms of international agreements, 
thus seem to have been highly salient. This cluster is followed by themes pertaining to basic 
positive and negative rights, and by the cluster ‘Democracy,’ suggesting that democracy and 
rights are more closely associated with the international context than with typically domestic 
concerns such as “secularism” and security. Note that all the parties have this correlation in 
common, including the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), whose overall score on the 
universalist dimension is quite low. The extent to which these universalist themes were 
brought up in favor of the amendments thus needs to be further investigated at the argument 
level. 
Within the center-periphery dimension, the focus seems to have been overwhelmingly 
centered on issues associated with security and ethnic separatism. The only party with a 
higher percentage of NPs in this dimension than in the universalist dimension is the NAP, 
followed at a distance by the Democratic Left Party (DLP). This is also in keeping with our 
expectations. Although the NAP and DLP are usually placed quite far apart on a 
conventional left-right scale, they are both considered loyal to the ‘center’ in terms of 
typically Kemalist concerns such as state unity and security. As mentioned earlier, both 
parties entered the 1999 elections promising to clamp down on the Kurdish insurgencies that 
took many lives during the nineties, a typical center-periphery concern. The theme analysis 
leaves no doubt that this concern has continued to play a role in their understanding of the 
three harmonization packages that they participated in debating. 
Although the DLP and NAP share an emphasis on center-periphery concerns, their emphases 
within this dimension differ somewhat. The NAP scores highest on security issues such as 
terrorism, followed by Kurdish separatism. The DLP’s emphasis, on the other hand, is more 
centered on the symbolic dimension of state unity, though less so than the RPP. Although it 
is perhaps not surprising that ‘Terrorism’ should correlate with ‘Security,’ the discrepancy in 
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emphases between the DLP and NAP suggests that the parties have had different agendas in 
bringing up centrist themes.  
In addition, it is somewhat surprising that the theme cluster ‘Secularism’ scores very low 
across the board. The rise of political Islam was a highly salient theme in both public and 
academic discourse between 1995 and 1999, and received particular attention from the 
secular-leftist media. Given the additional fact that the Islamist Welfare Party, which was 
shut down through an indirect military intervention in 1997, is represented by two successor 
parties in the parliament during the sessions in question, this merits investigation. It is likely 
that the typically Kemalist concern of preserving the secular nature of the state against 
“reactionary” forces associated with Islamic fundamentalism has been overshadowed by the 
political reaction against separatist violence, but additional clues might be found in the 
discourse of their counterparts, the Felicity Party and Justice and Development Party.  
Moving up a level, the argument analysis includes a wider range of contextual information, 
and treats the themes as subordinated to, and embedded in, arguments. As is readily 
apparent, there is a significant difference between the number of arguments recorded for 
each party, ranging from the Felicity Party’s 56 to the Motherland Party’s 11. In addition, 
the number of total units falls from 1501 in the theme analysis to only 219 in the argument 
analysis. As this makes the statistical significance of percentages less informative, the results 
have been left as they are. 
 
 RPP DLP NAP TPP MLP FP JDP 
Center-periphery 3 4 24 5 0 1 1 
Universalist 20 29 2 20 11 55 44 
        
The argument analysis largely coincides with the results of the theme analysis. Again, the 
majority of units fall within the universalist dimension, with only the NAP scoring a higher 
number within the center-periphery dimension. The number of arguments that could be 
interpreted as resting on center-periphery themes is diminutive among three of the parties 
traditionally associated with the periphery, the MLP, FP, and JDP. However, the True Path 
Party (TPP), interestingly, scores higher than its “twin,” the MLP.  
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Although the argument analysis is quite unambiguous in quantitative terms, it raises also 
interesting questions that merit further investigation. Firstly, the distance between the NAP 
and DLP in the argument analysis differs somewhat from that of the theme analysis, again 
indicating that although both parties seem to have emphasized centrist concerns, these 
concerns have played a different role in the parties’ arguments. Furthermore, the MLP, 
whose percentwise loading for the center-periphery dimension in the theme analysis was 
6.36, here drops to zero. In other words, the MLP has not paid heed to any centrist concerns 
whatsoever in arguing for or against the amendments, and has hardly mentioned them during 
their speeches. Considering the fact that the MLP, NAP, and DLP were coalition partners 
during the debates, this asymmetry needs to be investigated.  
Furthermore, the existence of center-periphery outliers among the arguments of the other 
parties raises the question of why and how they have argued in terms of center-periphery 
criteria at all. A plausible explanation for why they have done so could be that they have felt 
the need to accommodate the nationalist concerns of the NAP by arguing that the 
amendments will not endanger the unitary and sovereign nature of the state. Because these 
questions can only be answered by a qualitative, interpretive reading of each party’s 
positioning, using these empirical results as a basis, I now move on to a deeper analysis, 
taking into account a wider range of contextual factors.  
5.3 Interpreting the results 
5.3.1 The Republican People’s Party25 
As the prototypical centrist party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) seems to have gone 
quite far in adopting universalist frames, scoring higher on the universalist dimension in the 
theme analysis than the DLP, its post-1980 offshoot. This impression is somewhat tampered 
                                                
25 All translations from the transcripts of parliamentary sessions are my own. For the sake of 
readability, I have only included Turkish words or phrases in square brackets in the main document 
where the Turkish conveys associations not adequately represented by an English word. The original 
Turkish quotations are reproduced in footnotes. Page references are to page divisions in the 
transcripts that have been retrieved from the TGNA’s website. Note that these are not necessarily 
identical to page divisions in the printed editions of the transcripts (the Türkiye Büyük Meclisi 
Tutanak Dergisi).  
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by the argument analysis, where the RPP’s universalist score is just slightly below that of the 
DLP, but still quite high.  
A closer look at the universalist dimension of the theme analysis reveals that a majority of 
NPs recorded for the RPP fall under ‘International treaties/agreements’ and ‘Rights,’ with 
‘Legality’ and ‘Democracy’ below. As will become apparent further down, although the RPP 
is the only party to place more emphasis on legality than on democracy, their concern with 
legality is shared by several other parties. Two factors probably contributed to this. First, one 
of the amendment packages not covered by the analysis took place on 3 October 2001, and 
amended 34 paragraphs of the 1982 Constitution in preparation for the harmonization 
packages to come. Because these amendments were quite dramatic and relatively recent at 
the time of the debates, the extent to which the proposals belonging to the NPAA were in 
accordance with the Constitution can be considered a conveniently available theme, allowing 
parties in opposition to register discontent with the conduct of parties in government, while 
still supporting the spirit of the amendments. In many cases, therefore, the emphasis on 
legality does not necessarily reflect deep-seated ideological concerns, but may be ascribed to 
the need for parties to signal distance to each other. Secondly, many of the proposals drafted 
within the framework of the NPAA, both by the three-party coalition government and by the 
subsequent JDP government, were in fact written quite hastily, and, in the words of Avcı, 
amounted to “watered down versions of what was really needed” (Avcı 2006: 158). As we 
will see, several parties reacted to the wording of some of the proposals, arguing that they 
were not sufficiently precise. In general, however, these hesitations are set aside for the sake of 
passing necessary laws.  
A more interesting aspect of the RPP’s emphasis on the legal authority pertains to the 
relationship between the ostensibly universal status of the norms underlying the reforms and 
the imperative of national sovereignty intrinsic to the party’s ideological raison d’etre. 
Kemalism here proves to be a flexible ideology, capable of both supporting and opposing 
proposals. One the one hand, several narratives are constructed where EU membership, and 
the amendments made to accommodate it, are seen as natural outcomes of the modernization 
projects of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (cf. TBMM 2003b: 17). Indeed, as will become apparent 
in discussing the discourse of the DLP, the Kemalist thematic of bringing Turkey in line 
with the civilizational standards of Western modernity (çağdaşlık) provides a useful source 
of justification. Rather than constituting a concession to foreign powers, the normative 
principles underlying the reforms are commended for being in the spirit of Atatürk, and thus 
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an inevitable outcome of a process begun at the founding of the Republic. As an extension of 
this argument, one RPP speaker presents the handing over of legal sovereignty to the 
European Court of Human Rights positively, as a question of remaining sovereign by the 
Assembly’s doing so of its own will (TBMM 2003a: 42).  
On the other hand, this selective use of Kemalist thematics is not without its difficulties. 
When the topic of recognizing universal rights comes in the shape of demands from foreign 
powers such as the EU, reconciling it with popular and national sovereignty presents a 
formidable dilemma. Occasionally, the resulting conceptual difficulties provoke tortured 
attempts at tackling the paradox head-on:  
Esteemed friends, during this process we are faced with the following 
dilemma: The effect that the concepts “universality of law” and “national 
sovereignty” have on each other, and the need to evaluate the results of this, 
has emerged. From time to time, in some parts of society, the idea is 
expressed that the universal norms that come with this process do damage to 
sovereignty. Let us immediately state that in our day, now, protecting the 
existence of mechanisms that are to secure the right to fair trial, and the 
implementation of this right, have all become an indispensable right [sic.]. 
Certainly, under any circumstances, the defense of the unitary structure is also 
a compelling responsibility. It has been equipped with rights and freedoms 
within this conception and approach. However, taking the individual who is 
aware of its responsibilities as the foundation, there is a need for democracy 
for the sake of the individual’s freedom, laws for the sake of binding freedom 
to security, and finally, constitutional amendments that protect basic rights 
and freedoms vis-à-vis the authority of the public. 26 
This balancing act occasionally tips over into explicit skepticism regarding the entire 
process. On one occasion, the adaptation process is described as catering to the EU’s fickle 
will, aptly illustrating exasperation with what has been called the “moving target” problem 
of EU conditionality (Grabbe 2002): 
                                                
26 “Bu süreçte karşımıza şöyle bir ikilem çıkmakta değerli arkadaşlarım: Hukukun evrenselliği ile 
ulusal egemenlik kavramlarının birbirlerine olan etki ve sonuçlarını değerlendirmek gereği 
doğmaktadır; çünkü, bu yolla gelen evrensel normların egemenliği zedelediği düşüncesi, toplumun 
bazı kesimlerinde, zaman zaman ifade edilmektedir. Hemen belirtelim ki, günümüzde, artık, adil 
yargılanma hakkı ve bu hakkın uygulamaya geçirilmesini sağlayacak mekanizmaların varlığı ve 
korunması vazgeçilmez bir hak halini almıştır. Elbette, üniter yapının her halükârda korunması da 
vazgeçilmez bir sorumluluktur. Bu anlayış ve yaklaşım içerisinde, hak ve özgürlüklerle donatılmış; 
ancak, sorumluluklarının da bilincinde olan bireyi esas alarak, bireyin özgürlüğü için demokrasiye, 
özgürlüklerin güvenceye bağlanması için hukuka ve en nihayet, kamu otoritesi karşısında temel hak 
ve özgürlükleri koruyacak çağdaş anayasal düzenlemelere ihtiyaç vardır” (TBMM 2003b: 38). 
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Esteemed friends, when is the exalted Assembly going to see the end of this 
process? When are European Union authorities going to reach the point where 
they say to us, “we are satisfied, this is what we wanted”? [...] They will 
probably say, in the manner often seen in the press – just think about the past, 
remember – “Turkey has taken a very positive step, and we welcome and 
appreciate this; however, Turkey still has shortcomings; it still has a long way 
to go; it has to remove these shortcomings. These are important adaptations 
for us; let’s just see them first; we cannot make a decision without having 
seen them.” Thus, once this package has been passed, a typical European 
Union reply will appear.27 
There are also interesting combinations of anti-internationalist arguments clad in universalist 
terms. Here, the validity of universalist arguments is not questioned, but put to use against 
the Western world’s normative criticism of Turkey. For example, one amendment pertaining 
to the guarantee of basic human rights is discussed in terms of the United States’ lack of 
respect for those same rights in its activities in Iraq (TBMM 2003a: 39-40). Another speaker, 
recalling the domestic debates on the question of allowing US troops to use Turkish airbases 
during the early phases of their offensive in Iraq, states: 
When speaking of sovereignty and independence, should we not have thought 
about this sovereignty while the United States of America, whose image is 
that of an imperialist country, is allowed to have military bases within the 
borders of the Turkish Republic that we founded in the spirit of 1919!? 28,29 
In the same spirit, the EU’s demand for amendments that secure freedom of worship and 
religious organization are criticized as hypocritical. The EU, it is argued, has not shown the 
kind of tolerance towards its own Muslim citizens of Turkish descent that it now demands 
that Turkey shows towards its Christian and Jewish minorities (TBMM 2003b: 19, 27-28). In 
                                                
27 “Yüce Meclis, yolun sonunu ne zaman görecek değerli arkadaşlarım? Avrupa Birliği yetkilileri, 
bize, ne zaman, işte şimdi tatmin olduk, istediğimiz buydu deme noktasına gelecekler? ... Yani, 
diyeceklerdir ki, klasik, basında yer alan şekliyle -geçmiş dönemleri bir düşünün, bir hatırlayın- 
Türkiye çok olumlu bir adım atmıştır, bunu takdirle karşılıyoruz; ama, Türkiye'nin hâlâ eksikleri 
vardır, katetmesi gereken yol vardır, bunu gidermesi lazımdır; ayrıca, bizim için önemli olan da 
uygulamalardır, hele bir uygulamaları görelim, bunları görmeden karar veremeyiz. Klasik bir Avrupa 
Birliği yanıtı, bu paketin onayından sonra da, bu şekilde tecelli edecektir” (TBMM 2003b: 18). 
28 “Egemenlik, bağımsızlık derken, 1919'ların ruhuyla kurduğumuz Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin 
sınırlarında, emperyalist ülke görüntüsünde olan Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine verilen üslere izin 
verilirken, bu egemenlik hakkının düşünülmesi gerekmez miydi sevgili kardeşlerim?!” (TBMM 
2003a: 42).  
29 The “spirit of 1919” refers to date (19 May 1919) on which general Mustafa Kemal, later Atatürk, 
landed in Samsun and started his efforts to unite the nationalist independence movement against 
Greek, British, and Russian forces. 
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a sense, then, the RPP’s Kemalist legacy provides it with the opportunity to fashion itself as 
more in tune with Western values than the West itself. 
The RPP scores higher on the theme cluster ‘Secularism’ than any of the other parties. One 
possible explanation for this is the unease likely felt by RPP representatives in accepting and 
passing laws that were drafted by the JDP. Thus, while discussing a proposal meant to secure 
the right of religious communities to own real estate, one RPP speaker explicitly directs his 
criticism of the proposal at the JDP government: 
There is absolutely no obstacle to freedom of religion in Turkey. Give up on 
denouncing Turkey to Europe. There is exploitation of religion, but 
absolutely no obstacle to religious freedom in Turkey. Who has ever been 
prevented from worshiping?30 
In Turkey, the founders of the Turkish Republic never oppressed Muslims. 
They founded a regime entirely based on freedom of religion and conscience, 
and eighty years later, we are the ones upholding it. Let’s be honest!31 
It is, if course, difficult to gauge the extent to which these arguments reflect deep-seated 
convictions, or if they are made simply in order to maintain “face” in the presence of the 
JDP. Given the fact that the RPP cooperates in passing all of the amendments, the latter 
would seem a plausible explanation. However, it may also be the case that the RPP sees EU 
membership as more important than inhibiting the progress and public image of the JDP.  
In sum, the Republican People Party’s stance in the debates appears mixed. The analysis 
leaves little doubt that it has undergone a change. From being the archetypical state elite 
party, inventor and defender of Kemalist state principles, the RPP representatives’ discourse 
on the NPAA amendments for the most part draws on universalist themes. At the same time, 
several of their arguments are framed in center-periphery terms, expressing both support for 
the liberalization measures and distaste for the acquiescent manner in which they are being 
accepted. Illustrating the mixture of “longing and resentment” mentioned by Keyder (2006: 
75), one representative sums up the RPP’s attitude to the NPAA like this:  
                                                
30 “Türkiye'de din özgürlüklerinin önünde hiçbir engel yoktur. Türkiye'yi Avrupa'ya jurnallemekten 
vazgeçin. Türkiye'de din istismarı vardır, din özgürlüklerinin önünde hiçbir engel yoktur. Kim ibadet 
ederken engellenmiş?!” (TBMM 2003b: 28). 
31 “Türkiye'de, Türkiye Cumhuriyetini kuranlar, Müslümanlara hiçbir zaman baskı yapmamışlardır, 
Türkiye'de tam bir din ve vicdan hürriyetine dayalı bir rejim kurmuşlardır ve seksen seneden beri, 
biz, bu rejimi sürdürüyoruz, insaflı olalım!” (TBMM 2003b: 30). 
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We want to enter the European Union more than anyone else. But not by 
bending our necks, not by lowering our heads to everything they say.32 
5.3.2 The Democratic Left Party 
While the RPP’s dilemma seems to have been of a primarily symbolic character, in the 
discourse of the DLP, the same challenge takes the more concrete form. As the theme 
analysis shows, within the center-periphery dimension, the DLP’s emphasis is on ‘Statism/ 
centralism’ and ‘Security.’ Their central concern thus seems to have been guaranteeing basic 
rights while preserving security and combating political violence. The argument analysis 
further fortifies this impression. Although most of the DLP’s arguments have been recorded 
as universalist, a comparatively larger portion of their speaking time has been spent arguing 
in terms of concerns associated with the center-periphery dimension than that of the RPP.  
This must be interpreted against the backdrop of the composition of the TGNA during the 
parliamentary period in question. As mentioned before, Kurdish separatism was at the top of 
the agenda during the 1999 elections, and as will soon become apparent, the NAP in 
particular chose to dwell on these issues during the debates on the first three harmonization 
packages. This probably encouraged a similar response from the DLP. Thus, from the outset, 
the DLP asserts that universalist norms, while commendable in themselves, must be 
balanced against the harsh realities of a politically and culturally divided country: 
Basic rights and freedoms should appear in the laws in the widest form; in 
particular, limitations on freedom of thought and expression should be 
removed. However, as stated in paragraph 17 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, basic rights and freedoms do not include the freedom to 
destroy these freedoms. While legislating, every country takes into 
consideration its own sensitivities and particular conditions. We too, cannot 
overlook conditions particular to our country.33 
                                                
32 “Avrupa Birliğine girmeyi, biz, herkesten çok istiyoruz; ama, boynumuzu bükerek değil; her 
dediklerine baş eğerek değil” (TBMM 2003b: 29). 
33 “Yasalarda, temel hak ve özgürlükler en geniş biçimiyle yer almalı, özellikle, düşünce ve anlatım 
özgürlüğü üzerindeki sınırlamalar kaldırılmalıdır. Ancak, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesinin 17 nci 
maddesinde belirtildiği gibi, temel hak ve özgürlükler, özgürlükleri yok etme özgürlüğünü de 
içermemektedir. Her ülke, yasa yaparken, kendi duyarlılıklarını ve özel koşullarını dikkate alır. 
Bizler de, ülkemizin duyarlılıklarını gözardı edemeyiz” (TBMM 2002a: 22). 
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In general, however, the DLP seems to have managed to distance itself from the nationalistic 
rhetoric of its coalition partner. Like the RPP, the DLP representatives seem devoted to EU 
membership, and also appear to have realized the importance of embracing the reforms for 
their own sake if they are to appear credible in the eyes of Europeans. Thus, one the one 
hand, the fact that the amendments are made in the context of Turkey’s EU candidacy is 
mentioned several times. For example, towards the end of the 17-hour marathon session in 
which the third harmonization package was debated and passed, one DLP member likens the 
parliamentarians to “truck drivers who have set out on the road towards the European 
Union,” and have “just had a roadside soup break.”34 On the other hand, the point is 
underlined several times that the amendments are made not only in order to gain membership 
in the European Union, but for the sake of Turkey and its development.  
As I have made clear before, while the replacements made to some of the 
paragraphs within some of these laws may seem to be carried out in order for 
us to enter Europe, in essence what we are doing is to bringing our laws up to 
date with changing global conditions, as well as with the founding principles 
of our Republic. This is something we should be aware of.35 
We are not removing the death penalty in order to enter the European Union, 
but in order to become a civilized nation. We are doing it for ourselves. [...] 
Esteemed friends, the Turkish Nation is neither a fool nor an imbecile. The 
Turkish Nation is civilized, hard-working, and powerful. As the DLP, we 
support the European Union project and the modernization project.36 
As is apparent from these quotes, the DLP also shares with the RPP its use of Kemalist 
themes in justifying the amendments. The twin concepts of “modernity” and “civilization” 
are drawn upon to justify widening freedom of speech, organizational rights, and removing 
                                                
34 “Bu saatten sonra, Avrupa Birliğine doğru yola çıkmış TIR şoförleri gibiyiz. Biraz evvel çorba 
molasını da aldık” (TBMM 2002d: 109). 
35 “Bu bazı yasalardaki bazı maddelerin yenilenmesi, daha önce de belirttiğim gibi, Avrupa'ya girmek 
adına yapılıyor görünse de, özünde yaptığımız, yasalarımızı, değişen dünya koşullarına ve 
cumhuriyetimizin kuruluş ilkelerine uygun hale getirmektir. Bunu bilmeliyiz ve görmeliyiz” (TBMM 
2002d: 70). 
36 “Biz, idamı, Avrupa Birliğine girelim diye kaldırmıyoruz; medenî bir millet olduğumuz için 
kaldırıyoruz, kendimiz için kaldırıyoruz. [...] Değerli arkadaşlarım, Türk Milleti ne aptaldır, ne 
enayidir; Türk Ulusu medenîdir, çalışkandır ve güçlüdür. DSP olarak, Avrupa Birliği projesini, 
çağdaşlık projesini destekliyoruz” (TBMM 2002d: 10). 
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the death penalty. The latter is presented as an archaic concept, a “primitive system of 
punishment” that most “civilized countries have foregone during the 21st century.”37 
Capital punishment has existed throughout history, but as mankind’s reason 
developed, so the process of removing it began. There can be no talk of 
violating Turkey’s rights of sovereignty, and removing capital punishment 
can not be characterized as a concession.38 
The work we are doing [in removing the death penalty] constitutes an 
important step in the Republican revolution outlined by Mustafa Kemal, and 
on the road toward EU membership.39 
There are also interesting examples of what must be read as purposeful re-interpretations of 
concepts associated with the center-periphery conflict. Like the RPP, the DLP draws on 
highly symbolical historical themes with strong resonance within a Kemalist national 
narrative. On the question of allowing religious communities to own property, for example, 
one amendment is justified with reference to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In Turkish 
historiography, the Lausanne Treaty is considered one of great victories of the nationalist 
independence movement’s struggle against foreign colonialist powers, nullifying the 
humiliating conditions of the Sevres Treaty of 1920. One would therefore expect it to be 
referred to in the context of arguing against the amendment. In this quote, however, a DLP 
representative uses it in support of easing restrictions on minority foundations: 
                                                
37 “İdam ilkel bir ceza sistemidir arkadaşlar. 21 inci Yüzyılda medenî uluslar bu sistemden 
vazgeçiyorlar, hatta büyük bir kesimi de vazgeçti” (TBMM 2002d: 10). 
38 “İdam cezası tarih boyunca var olmuştur; ama, insan aklı geliştikçe, bu ceza ortadan kaldırılmaya 
başlanmıştır [...] Türkiye'nin egemenlik haklarına aykırılıktan bahsedilemez ve idam cezasının 
kaldırılması, bir taviz olarak nitelendirilemez” (TBMM 2002d: 10). 
39 “Bu yaptığımız iş, Mustafa Kemal çizgisinin, cumhuriyet ihtilalinin yeni bir aşamasına, AB 
üyeliğine giden yolda önemli bir adım teşkil ediyor.” (TBMM 2002d: 143) 
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I am going to clarify the thoughts of my group on the fourth paragraph, 
regarding the acquirement of real estate by [religious] communities. The 
phrase “religious communities” [cemaat] is a provocative one; unfortunately, 
because it is capable of conveying the notion of minority, and because it is 
related to religious beliefs, it is vulnerable to all sorts of suspicion and 
exploitation. What we need to understand about the phrase “religious 
community” in the paragraph in question is that it refers to communities as 
they are defined in the Lausanne Treaty, which can be regarded as our 
Republic’s title deed [tapu]. Here, the communities in question are Turkish 
compatriots. They consist of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, and are 
guaranteed security by the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.40 
Similar universalist uses of center-periphery thematics are found in discussions on allowing 
broadcasting in minority languages. As mentioned earlier, the atmosphere of the debates in 
which the NAP representatives were present were characterized by a high level of sensitivity 
toward themes associated with Kurdish minorities. One would expect the DLP to address 
this concern, in particular considering the fact that its government was responsible for 
bringing Abdullah Öcalan into Turkish custody. However, instead of arguing against the 
amendments, the DLP generally translates the concern for preserving national unity and 
security into support for liberalization. For example, one representative argues that easing 
restrictions will cause separatism to diminish, not flare up:  
I have said this here once before, speaking on the topic of [music] cassettes: 
my native language is Kurdish; I also love Kurdish music, and listen to it. 
While it was outlawed, because it was nowhere to be found, I would implore 
and ask to be allowed to buy it whenever I came across it. But when it 
became legalized, and [cassettes] were given official seals of approval 
[bandrol], that ardor and enthusiasm, that searching, disappeared from me 
and from everyone else.41 
Although this does amount to a justification within the center-periphery frame, it is worth 
noting that a statement openly displaying a representative’s identification as a Kurd would 
                                                
40 “Cemaatlerin taşınmaz mal edinmeleriyle ilgili 4 üncü madde üzerinde, Grubumun düşüncelerini 
açıklayacağım. "Cemaat" sözcüğü, iştah kabartıcı bir sözcük; azınlık ifade edebildiği için, dinsel 
inançlarla ilintili olduğu için, maalesef, her türlü kuşkuya, istismara açık. Önümüzdeki yasa 
maddesindeki "cemaat" sözcüğünden anlamamız gereken, cumhuriyetimizin tapusu niteliğindeki 
Lozan Antlaşmasında geçen cemaatlerdir. Burada, söz konusu olan cemaatler, Türk yurttaşlarıdır; 
Rumlar, Ermeniler ve Musevilerden oluşan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasının güvencesi altında 
olan Türk yurttaşlarıdır” (TBMM 2002d: 58).  
41 “Ben, bir kez daha bu kürsüden kaset konusunu söylemiştim: Benim anadilim Kürtçedir; müziği de 
severim, dinlerim de. Yasak olduğu zaman, kimde bulsam, yalvararak alıyordum, rica ediyordum; 
çünkü yoktu. Ne zamanki serbest oldu, bandrole bağlandı, hakikaten, o şevk, o heyecan, o arayış 
kalmadı kimsede; ne bende ne de bir başkasında” (TBMM 2002d: 103). 
 55 
have been all but unthinkable a few years earlier. In a sense, it is an example of how far it is 
possible to go in embracing cultural and ethnic pluralism without entirely leaving a state-
centered frame.  
In sum, the DLP appears to have sought a middle ground between center-periphery and 
universalist justification. Like the RPP, it goes a long way towards adopting a universalist 
frame in discussing the amendments. It has an overall slightly higher emphasis on 
universalist than on center-periphery thematics, but tends to draw on center-periphery 
thematics in the context of supporting liberalization measures. At the same time, a closer 
reading has shown that the theme analysis does reflect a certain amount of misgivings with 
regard to security issues.  
5.3.3 The Nationalist Action Party 
The NAP has a high score on all theme clusters in the center-periphery dimension, but 
‘Kurdish separatism’ and ‘security’ are particularly high. Their equally high score on this 
dimension in the argument analysis suggests that NAP representatives have been 
disproportionately concerned with the consequences that the amendments will have on the 
behavior of Kurdish minorities, and on the latitude afforded to the state in controlling them. 
A closer reading of the transcripts confirms this impression: unlike nearly all other parties, 
the NAP opposed many of the proposals, despite the fact that they were drafted by fellow 
government parties.  
This may be partly explained by the state of the coalition government during the sessions. 
While the two first adaptation packages receive grudging support from the NAP, the third 
and longest debate sees much of the NAP’s harshest criticism and all-out rejections. By the 
time of the third debate, the coalition partners had openly acknowledged their difficulties in 
cooperating, and had proposed early elections to be held in November 2002. Thus, in all 
likelihood, the NAP representatives felt free to speak their minds independently of the DLP 
and MLP.  
Another aspect of the NAP’s discourse not captured by the theme and argument analyses is 
the overall tone of their speeches. The speeches made by NAP representatives grow 
increasingly confrontational toward the end of the third debate, explicitly addressing the 
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present members of other parties in an emotionally laden language. When representatives of 
other parties speak, NAP members continuously disrupt their speeches.42 Several of the 
NAP’s arguments have not been recorded in the argument analysis at all, due to the fact that 
they do not address any legislative proposal whatsoever. Instead, much of their 
argumentation consists of defensive posturing, arguing about who proposed what first, and 
accusing other parties of selling out to the West and of unjustly attributing the NAP with 
various views: 
I would like to address the members of the TPP, who say they are 
nationalists: Is unconditional surrender to the Europeans your idea of 
nationalism?! [...] You members of the Felicity Party: since when did you 
become defenders of the Western clubs? Do you suffer pangs of conscience 
over the sale of your native land?!43 
This behavior is quite unique to the NAP in the material analyzed, and may seem irrational. 
The TGNA bylaws provide representatives with regularized opportunities to address 
personal affronts and perceived injustices towards themselves or their parties; thus, spending 
so much of the time allotted to discussing the amendments on bickering would qualify as 
counter-productive. When seen in connection with the substance of their arguments, 
however, it can at least partially be explained by the NAP’s conception of what is at stake in 
passing the amendments. A look at the universalist dimension of the thematic analysis 
reveals an emphasis on ‘International treaties/ agreements,’ followed by ‘Rights’ and 
‘Democracy.’ This suggests, first of all, that the democratic and rights-based normative 
dimension of the amendments is treated as subordinated to the external dimension. Like the 
RPP, then, there is a significant tendency to frame the amendments as impositions from 
external forces. Unlike the RPP, however, the NAP sees these impositions as part of a highly 
concrete plan, “a project […] to invent minorities whose ultimate aim is to divide and tear 
                                                
42 A member of the New Turkey Party, commenting on the NAP’s unorderly conduct, expressed his 
frustration like this: “Esteemed friends, having witnessed the scene we have experienced the last 
couple days, one does not feel like one is in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, nor in any grand 
national assembly whatsoever, but in the corner of a coffeehouse.” (“Değerli arkadaşlarım, özellikle 
iki gündür yaşadığımız tabloyu görünce, insan kendisini, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde değil de, 
bu büyük milletin Meclisinde değil de, bir kahvehane köşesindeymiş gibi hissediyor”) (TBMM 
2002d: 59). 
43 “Milliyetçi olduklarını ifade eden DYP'lilere seslenmek istiyorum: Sizin milliyetçilik anlayışınız, 
kayıtsız şartsız Avrupalılara teslim olmak mıdır?! […] Siz Saadet Partililer, ne zamandan beri Batı 
kulüplerinin savunucusu oldunuz; vatan toprağının satılması vicdanlarınızı sızlatmıyor mu?!” 
(TBMM 2002d: 59). 
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asunder Turkey.”44 Thus, if the other parties do not share this view, they are in effect 
cooperating with the enemy: 
The respected secretary-general of one of our parties that, having stood united 
for years, is now separating into two, gave a statement yesterday about the 
early elections that will be held on the third of November, where he 
emphasized that the elections will stand between the Nationalist Forces and 
the collaborators.45 Who said this? – The secretary general of a party that 
today is fervently supporting the European Union and the Copenhagen 
Criteria.46 
Secondly, a closer reading of the transcripts reveal that even in the domestic context, the 
NAP’s conception of democracy and rights amounts to respecting the will of a “people” 
weary of separatist terror. Their confrontational passages abound with phrases invoking the 
authority of the Turkish people, such as “the people have learned from their mistakes, and 
are listening to you” and “you should know that the Turkish people will never forgive you 
for this.”47 Combined with their antagonistic conception of the EU, a picture is painted of a 
Turkey under siege from both internal and external enemies, suppressing the will of the 
people in the name of rights and democracy. The PKK is described as an organization that 
has “fought to split and tear asunder the Republic of Turkey with the help of foreign 
powers.”48 The process of adapting to EU conditionality, in turn, is said to “leave the door 
                                                
44 “... bugün ülkemizde, nihaî amacı Türkiye'yi bölüp parçalamak olan yapay azınlıklar üretme 
projesi uygulanmaktadır” (TBMM 2002d: 119). 
45 The “Nationalist Forces” (Kuvayi Milliyeciler) refers to Atatürk’s army that fought the War of 
Independence against Greek, Russian, and British occupiers. “Collaborators” (mandacılar) refers to 
Turks who collaborated with and supported the British occupiers during the War of Independence. 
46 “Yıllarca beraberken, ikiye ayrılan siyasî partilerimizden birinin sayın genel sekreteri 3 Kasımda 
yapılacak erken seçimler sebebiyle dün verdiği demeçte, bu seçimlerin Kuvayi Milliyeciler ile 
mandacılar arasında geçeceğini vurguluyor. Bunları kim söylemiş; Avrupa Birliği ve Kopenhag 
kriterleri diyen ve bugün bu yasa teklifini hararetle destekleyen bir partinin genel sekreteri” (TBMM 
2002d: 111). 
47 “Halk sizi ibretle dinliyor” (TBMM 2002d: 57). “Biliniz ki, bu davranışınızı tarih ve Türk Milleti 
asla affetmeyecektir” (Ibid.:59). 
48 “1984'ten 2000 yılına kadar 36 000 vatan evladının ölümüne sebep olan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Devletini bölmeye ve parçalamaya yönelik dış güçlerle birlikte hareket ederek mücadele eden bölücü 
PKK örgütünün yaptıklarına ‘Türkiye'de demokrasi yoktur; dolayısıyla da, sesini duyurabilmek için 
böyle bir yolu denemek zorunda kalmıştır’ demek, masum bir davranış mıdır?” (TBMM 2002a: 35). 
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open” for “the PKK’s politicization program.”49 Consequently, “[a]t this moment, in front of 
you, all the families of the victims, all the military heroes are watching us and the decision 
we are about to make.”50 
This highly antagonistic take on Kemalist nationalism receives its fullest expression in the 
NAP’s use of historical narrative in framing the proposals. While the DLP draws on the 
historical examples of the Sevres and Lausanne treaties to justify easing restrictions of 
minority rights, the NAP’s use of historical narratives fits squarely within a militant centrist 
understanding of the situation, complete with far-ranging conspiracy theories. Ultimately, it 
seems, complying with the EU’s wishes entails selling the Fatherland “to Armenians, 
Greeks, and Jews,” an act that “will never be forgiven by history or by the Turkish nation.”51 
[Y]esterday, empires were the biggest obstacle to international capital. Then, 
the empires collapsed, and nation states were founded. Today, the biggest 
obstacles to international capital, which has ascended to the highest footing in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms, is the nation state. As the examples of 
Yugoslavia and Slovakia show, right now, the process of eliminating the 
nation state has begun. Turkey is among the closest objectives of this project, 
the final aim of which is to found a global state consisting of small city-states. 
The historical hidden plan of this project consists in the age-old Eastern 
policy of throwing us Turks out of Europe, then out of Anatolia, and finally 
driving us into exile in the Eastern Caucasus. We cannot explain or 
understand the separatist terror that has cost the lives of thousands of our 
people, nor fully see the political separatist tendencies behind the 
Copenhagen Criteria, without taking this into account. […] We, as the 
Nationalist Action Party, consider the proposal to allow the broadcasting and 
teaching of mother tongues to be a forerunner for such a separatist project. An 
attempt is being made to create false minorities in our country, even false 
nations. The second stage of these tendencies will be federation, and finally, 
the realization of Sevres.52 
                                                
49 “Değerli milletvekilleri, kafamızı kuma sokmanın anlamı yok. Avrupa Birliğine girme süreciyle, 
bu noktadaki kararlılığımızla, bu noktadaki uzlaşmamızla PKK'nın siyasallaşma programının 
birbiriyle örtüşmesine çanak tutamayız, müsaade edemeyiz. [...] Buna kapı aralayamayız” (TBMM 
2002a: 25). 
50 “Şu anda, karşınızda, bütün şehit aileleri, bütün gaziler burayı gözetliyor, bizim alacağımız kararı 
gözetliyor” (TBMM 2002d: 7). 
51 “Vatan toprağını, Ermenilere, Rumlara ve Yahudilere satmak isteyenleri tarih ve Türk Milleti 
affetmeyecektir” (TBMM 2002d: 57). 
52 “[D]ün, uluslararası sermayenin önündeki en büyük engel imparatorluklardı; imparatorluklar 
yıkıldı, ulus devletler kuruldu. Bugün ise, niteliği ve niceliği en üst seviyeye çıkmış olan uluslararası 
sermayenin önündeki en büyük engel, ulus devletlerdir. Yugoslavya ve Slovakya örneğinde olduğu 
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That this situational definition is meant quite literally is apparent from other passages, too. 
Speaking of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in the neighborhood of Fener in Istanbul, one 
MP states that “[w]e are worried that a new Fener State will be invented in Istanbul; this is 
what our concern stems from.”53  
Another selective use of Kemalist thematics is found in the NAP’s emphasis on national 
sovereignty and pride. Unlike the RPP and the DLP two former parties, the NAP shows no 
signs of compromising sovereignty in order to strengthen minority rights. To the extent that 
minorities are discussed, this occurs only in the context of asserting the sovereignty of the 
Turkish state vis-à-vis other countries. Thus, European countries are criticized for not 
fulfilling the criteria that they are imposing on Turkey. In discussing an amendment that 
would allow minority foundations to obtain real estate in Turkey, one representative states: 
“If the principle of reciprocity were respected, would the remains of tens of thousands of our 
foundations in the Balkans have been destroyed? Would those who are unable to tolerate 
even Turkish gravestones have been respectful of our mosques, religious schools, fountains 
and caravanserais?”54 Similarly, easing restrictions on the use of minority languages amounts 
to treachery against the memory of Atatürk. Here, the RPP and DLP’s attempts at re-
interpreting Kemalism to allow for a greater amount of cultural pluralism in the public 
sphere are explicitly contested.  
                                                                                                                                                 
gibi, şimdi, ulus devletlerin tasfiye süreci başlatılmıştır. Nihaî amacı kent devletçiklerinden oluşan 
küresel devleti kurmak olan bu projenin yakın hedefleri arasında Türkiye de vardır. Temel amacı, biz 
Türkleri önce Avrupa'dan, sonra da Anadolu'dan atarak Kafkasların doğusuna sürmek olan kadim 
Şark politikası da, bu projenin tarihî arka planını oluşturmaktadır. Bu temel gerçekleri görmeden, ne 
binlerce insanımızın canına mal olan bölücü terörü gerektiği gibi anlatabiliriz, anlayabiliriz ne de 
Kopenhag Kriterlerinin arasına sıkıştırılmış olan siyasal bölücü dayatmaları net olarak görebiliriz. 
[…] Biz, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi olarak, anadilde yayın ve öğrenimi öngören kanun teklifini, böyle 
bir bölücü projenin öncü adımı olarak değerlendiriyoruz. Bu yolla, ülkemizde yapay azınlıklar, hatta 
yapay milletler oluşturulmak istenmektedir. Bu dayatmaların ikinci aşaması, federasyon olacaktır; 
son aşaması ise, Sevr'in gerçekleştirilmesidir” (TBMM 2002d: 119-20). 
53 “İstanbul'da yeni Fener Devleti icat edilmesin diye endişe ediyoruz; endişemiz bundan 
kaynaklanıyor” (TBMM 2002d: 65). 
54 “Eğer, karşılıklılık ilkesi tanınsaydı, Balkanlar'daki onbinlerce vakıf eserimiz yerle bir edilebilir 
miydi?! Türklerin mezar taşlarına bile tahammül edemeyenler, camilerimize, medreselerimize, çeşme 
ve kervansaraylarımıza saygılı oldular mı?!” (TBMM 2002d: 57). 
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The exalted Atatürk did not instate the Law on the Unification of Education 
and carry out the language reform in order for you to change the language of 
instruction here in the exalted Assembly that He founded. This is not what he 
carried out the language reform for. […] Some people, by stating in the name 
of Kemalism and the Republic that they are going to carry Turkey into the 
future, are unfortunately going to create serious troubles in Turkey. They are 
in fact leading [Turkey] into an outcome that may once again pit brother 
against brother as enemies.55 
In sum, the NAP shows no signs of yielding its centrist position to allow for universalist 
considerations. Both the theme analysis and argument analysis show an overall emphasis on 
center-periphery concerns, and as the examples above show, the rhetorical context in which 
they occur is unyieldingly aligned with a centrist-nationalist position. All attempts at re-
interpreting the center-periphery dichotomy in a less antagonistic fashion are interpreted by 
the NAP as hidden attempts at undermining the sovereignty of the Turkish state. Thus, 
representatives of other parties frequently find themselves in a position where they have to 
defend their positions in terms of centrist concerns. As we have seen, this is to some extent 
true of the DLP, and as the next chapter will show, the True Path Party may also have been 
affected.  
5.3.4 The True Path Party 
As the theme analysis shows, like the FP and JDP, a good portion of the noun phrases 
recorded for the TPP in the universalist dimension comes under the theme clusters 
‘Democracy’ and ‘Rights.’ A closer reading of the transcripts furthermore reveals that the 
TPP has gone beyond appeals to empty phrases, and has been very concerned with 
discussing the meaning and substance of these terms. Particular attention is given to the need 
for strengthening organizational rights in order to bring about a sound democracy. In this, 
most of the amendments are commended for breaking with the “mechanical and legalistic” 
approach of the past.56  
                                                
55 “Yüce Atatürk, Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanununu ve harf inkılabını, siz, O'nun kurduğu Yüce Mecliste 
eğitim dilini değiştiresiniz diye çıkarmadı; harf inkılabını bunun için yapmadı. […] Birileri, 
Atatürkçülük adı altında, cumhuriyet adı altında, Türkiye'yi yarınlara taşıyacağını söyleyerek, 
maalesef, Türkiye'nin içinde ciddî anlamda sıkıntılar yaratacak, kardeşi kardeşe yeniden düşman 
edebilecek neticeye doğru götürüyor” (TBMM 2002d: 95). 
56 “Bakınız, devletimiz, sistemimiz bu sorunu, henüz, sosyolojik akılla okuyabilmiş değildir, mekanik 
bir yasakçı gözle okuyor” (TBMM 2002b: 37). 
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One possibly self-interested rationale for this concern is hinted at in pages where the TPP’s 
lineage is mentioned. In the context of discussing an amendment to the Law on Political 
Parties, the Democrat Party (DP) of the 1950s is mentioned as having, for the first time, 
“changed governance with the help of the will of the nation.”57 Along with the Justice Party 
(JP) of the 1960s and 70s, it is said to be “in the roots of the True Path Party.”58 As is well 
known, the DP ended tragically with the coup in 1960, when their leader and Prime Minister, 
Menderes, and two of the DP government’s ministers, were executed. The JP, the most 
powerful party of the twenty years it was in existence, performed a constant balancing act to 
remain in favor with the Army until its demise, along with all other parties, in the 1980 coup 
(cf. Çizre 1993). It is therefore not surprising that one TPP representative describes political 
parties as “a bridge between the nation and state, and a very important element in 
maintaining peaceful relations between [them],”59 which therefore “must be protected.”60 In 
one passage, this lineage is also linked directly to the effort to join the EU:  
The European Union has been a fifty-year long struggle. When Celal Bayar 
and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu,61 who had been put on death row on Yassıada, saw 
their dear friends placed in a boat, their hands tied behind their backs, to be 
sent to İmralı Island for the execution of their sentences, Celal Bayar turned 
to Mr. Zorlu and asked: “Mr. Zorlu, if the European Union accepts Turkey, 
what effect will this have on our social and economic life?”62 
                                                
57 “Siyasî partilere biz çok önem vermekteyiz. 1946 ile başlayan siyasî hareket, 1950'nin 14 
Mayısıyla, Demokrat Parti iktidarıyla, ilk defa, millet iradesiyle idareyi değiştirmiştir” (TBMM 
2002c: 43). 
58 “Doğru Yol Partisi, köklerinden olan Demokrat Partisini, öz kökü olan Adalet Partisini, sistemin 
bu yanlış yorumuyla kaybetmesi tecrübesini de gözeterek [...]” (TBMM 2002b: 37). 
59 “[S]iyasî partilerin, milletle devlet arasında bir köprü olduğunu, hizmetlerde, devletle milletin 
barışık olmasında çok önemli bir unsur olduğunu ifade etmiştim.” (TBMM 2002c: 53). 
60 “Siyasî partilerin çok önemli olduğunu, milletle devleti kucaklaştıran bir unsur olduğunu ve siyasî 
partilerin çok önemli bir şekilde korunması lazım geldiğini düşünüyorum” (TBMM 2002c: 43). 
61 Celal Bayar was the one of the founders of the Democrat Party, and president of the Republic 
1950-1960. Rüştü Zorlu was foreign minister of the Democrat Party government. Both were 
sentenced to death by the military tribunal after the coup of 1960, but Bayar’s sentence was 
commuted due to his age. 
62 “Avrupa Birliği, elli yıldan beri devam eden bir mücadele. Yassıada'da idama mahkûm edilen 
Celal Bayar ve Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, diğer kıymetli arkadaşları, elleri arkadan bağlı, motora bindirilir ve 
İmralı Adasına infaz için sevk edilirler. Celal Bayar, Fatin Bey'e döner "Fatin Bey, Türkiye Avrupa 
Birliğine kabul edilirse, bunun sosyal ve ekonomik hayatımıza tesirleri ne olur" diye sorar” (TBMM 
2002d: 27). 
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Thus, it is more than likely that the TPP, identifying with the victims of political oppression, 
welcome the EU-related amendments as strengthening their own position. For the most part, 
however, the TPP representatives go far in underlining the inherent necessity of the reforms. 
“The goal of entering the European Union,” it is stated, “is first and foremost a project to get 
the state, the people, the nation, and the Turkish human being on its feet.”63  
Only when it comes to the debates on the third package do the TPP representatives show 
strains. As can be seen from the argument analysis, a larger portion of the TPP’s arguments 
rely on themes associated with the center-periphery dimension than their “twin,” the 
Motherland Party. All of these occur during the third debate. There is still an emphasis on 
rights, but the need for liberalizing reforms is more often presented in terms of national 
interests. As criticism starts to be directed at the behavior of the NAP, the latter’s centrist 
line of argumentation comes to be adopted by the TPP, and put to use in supporting the 
amendments. Much like the DLP, then, it is argued that the EU does not pose a threat to 
national unity, but that the amendments may in fact strengthen the nation: “There is not one 
country that, upon entering the European Union, has been split into pieces, not one country 
whose borders have changed, or whose culture has been lost.”64 That these arguments are 
directed at the NAP is clear when seen in context.  
Now, one wing of the coalition has criticized the European Union’s criteria. 
Very well, fine, what is your solution? Let’s solve it; let’s make heroic 
speeches, let’s save our party, but at what price? At the price of blocking 
Turkey’s progress. And the name of this is nationalism, love of one’s 
fatherland, is that so?!65 
Just as the NAP criticizes the TPP’s conception of national interests, then, so the TPP argues 
that the NAP’s position does more harm than good to the Turkish nation. Thus, although the 
                                                
63 “Sosyolojik gözle değerlendirebilirsiniz, jeostratejik bir zaruret olarak da görebilirsiniz; ama, bir 
hususa dikkatlerinizi çekmek istiyorum: Avrupa Birliği veya Batılılaşma hedefi, en başta, devletin, 
halkı, milleti, Türk insanını yola getirmesi projesiydi” (TBMM 2002b: 36). 
64 “İkincisi, Avrupa Birliğine [...] girip de parçalanan bir tek ülke yok, Avrupa Birliğine girip de 
sınırları değişen bir tek ülke yok, Avrupa Birliğine girip de kültürünü kaybetmiş bir ülke yok, 
sınırlarından taş zorlanmış ülke yok” (TBMM 2002d: 121). 
65 “Şimdi, koalisyonun bir kanadında, Avrupa Birliği kriterlerine itiraz var; çok güzel, tamam; çözüm 
yolunuz nedir; reddedelim, hamasi nutuklar atalım, partimizi kurtaralım; ne pahasına; Türkiye'nin 
önünü tıkama pahasına. Bunun adı da milliyetçilik, vatanseverlik; öyle mi?!” (TBMM 2002d: 9). 
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TPP occasionally reverts to nationalist argumentation, it is clear that their aim in doing so is 
to bring the understanding of national interests into harmony with the EU-related reforms.  
5.3.5 The Motherland Party 
In quantitative terms, the Motherland Party’s contribution to the debates is very limited, with 
a total of 11 speeches. This quantitative paucity is to some extent compensated for by the 
quality of the individual argument. As one of the coalition partners in the 1999-2002 
government, the MLP participated in drafting the proposal texts of the first and second 
packages, and presented the third package alone when the coalition was falling apart. One 
would therefore expect MLP representatives to not only support the packages, but to have a 
strong line of argumentation to do so with. As both the theme and argument analyses show, 
their framing has been done in terms of the universalist dimension more than that of any of 
the other parties, with 93 percent of their themes, and 100 percent of their arguments, 
recorded as universalist. Moreover, in relation to the number of arguments, the number of 
themes recorded is quite high, suggesting an efficient use of time, with a high frequency of 
references to value-laden themes.  
Within the theme analysis, a majority of themes fall under the cluster ‘International treaties/ 
agreements.’ A contextual reading shows that many of these occur in the context of 
explaining the proposals’ legal genealogy in terms of the history of the international treaties 
and declarations that they derive their principles from. These treaties and declarations are, in 
turn, always presented in terms of their inherent legitimacy, never as impositions from 
outside, nor as strategically valuable from the viewpoint of national interests. Furthermore, 
the MLP seems to perceive no discrepancy between the founding principles of the Republic 
and the process it has now entered. The NPAA is described as “an opportunity to rectify the 
mistakes we have made during our two hundred year long Westernization process and forty 
year long European Union process.”66 These mistakes, furthermore, have already been 
identified and described by the founding father of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: 
                                                
66 “İkiyüz yıllık Batılılaşma ve kırk yıllık Avrupa Birliği sürecinde yaptığımız hataları ve 
kaybettiğimiz zamanları telafi etme fırsatıyla karşı karşıyayız” (TBMM 2002b: 34). 
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Esteemed friends, we should know that resisting the flow of change and 
history is a wasted effort. These efforts are anyhow not in the interest of our 
nation. We should all take the great Atatürk as an example in this. The great 
Atatürk, who waged war against the West, immediately after the war stated 
that our nation’s goal is to become one with the West. On his historical 
speech on the 29th of October 1923 he said, “We want to modernize our 
nation. All our efforts are aimed at bringing into being a modern, and 
therefore Western, government in Turkey.” Again, explaining where the 
Ottomans went wrong, the great Atatürk said: “The fall of the Ottoman state 
started the day it, haughty from the victories over the West, cut the ties that 
bound it to the European people.”67 
Although this may seem a universalist use of centrist arguments, in the context in which it 
occurs, it is clear that the target of the argument is the state-centered appeals of the NAP. For 
the MLP, following the example of Atatürk means devolving the state’s dominance and 
providing civil society and private enterprise with more elbowroom. Countries with 
developed and strong civil societies, it is argued, are frequently also the richest countries, 
because “a liberal economy and free market works better in countries where free thought and 
democratic criteria are more developed.”68 To achieve this, however, the state must yield 
some of its transcendence, and allow for two-way influence between state and society.  
Look, our basic problem is this: in our country, in our eyes, the state is our 
father… We have no objection to the state being a father; however, our father 
is a little harsh, a little authoritarian. What we want, what we desire, is that 
our father becomes a little more compassionate and tolerant towards his 
children.69 
                                                
67 “Değişme ve tarihin akışına direnmenin boşuna bir gayret olduğunu bilmeliyiz değerli arkadaşlar. 
Ayrıca, bu direnişler milletimizin menfaatına da değildir. Bu konuda, hepimiz Büyük Atatürk'ü örnek 
almalıyız. Batı'ya karşı savaşan Büyük Atatürk, savaştan hemen sonra ülkemizin hedefini Batı'yla 
bütünleşmek olarak ortaya koymuştur. 29 Ekim 1923'te yaptığı tarihî konuşmada "milletimizi 
asrîleştirmek istiyoruz. Bütün çalışmamız Türkiye'de asrî, binaenaleyh, Batılı bir hükümet vücuda 
getirmek içindir" demiştir. Yine, Büyük Atatürk, Osmanlının nerede hata yaptığını anlatırken şöyle 
demiştir: ‘Osmanlı Devletinin sukutu, garba karşı elde ettiğimiz muzafferiyetlerden mağrur olarak 
kendisini Avrupa milletine bağlayan rabıtalarını kestiği gün başlamıştır’” (TBMM 2002b: 34). 
68 “Demokrasileri oturmuş, siyasî çarkları daha iyi dönen, daha iyi işleyen, sivil toplumu gelişmiş 
ülkelerin aynı zamanda zengin ülkeler olması tamamen tesadüf mü? Bu durum, liberal ekonominin 
ve serbest pazarın, hür düşünce ve demokratik kriterlerin daha çok geliştiği ülkelerde daha iyi 
çalıştığını göstermiyor mu” (TBMM 2002b: 34). 
69 “Bizde, işte, temel mesele bu. Bizim ülkemizde, bizim gözümüzde devlet, baba... Devletin 
babalığına bir itirazımız yok; ancak, bizim baba biraz sert, biraz da otoriter. Bizim istediğimiz, 
arzuladığımız, bizim babamızın, evlatlarına biraz daha şefkatli olması, evlatlarına karşı biraz daha 
hoşgörülü olması” (TBMM 2002b: 35). 
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This line of argument is also extended to permit minorities an equal range of freedoms to 
that of Turkish Muslims. There are a few passages that recall the DLP’s argument that 
minorities should be allowed broadcasting in the mother tongues, because this will have the 
effect of ameliorating social unrest. Thus, for example, “the bases of separatist movements 
have always consisted of cultures that were considered to be nothing, and purposely 
overlooked.”70 On the whole, however, their arguments are of a principled nature: 
[T]he foundations of democracy are rights and freedoms. Every human being 
is born with certain rights, and those rights cannot in any way be 
circumscribed or limited. Communication is one of these rights. It is a well-
known fact that a segment of our citizens, for reasons of tradition and of other 
social factors, use their mother tongues. […] It is up to us to make 
amendments according to the requirements of the age and of becoming a 
democratic state. […] This is a guarantee that our unity and wholeness will be 
protected and that a synergy will be created out of differences.71 
In this, the MLP is closely aligned with the TPP of the first two debates. This impression is 
fortified by the fact that the MLP also expresses its identification with the two large populist 
parties of the past, the Democrat Party and the Justice Party. Like the TPP, this identification 
is asserted in the context of narrating the history of Turkey’s relations with the EU.  
                                                
70 “Yok sayılan, görmezden gelinen kültürler, ayrılıkçı hareketlerin hep temelini oluşturmuşlardır” 
(TBMM 2002d: 97). 
71 “Sayın milletvekilleri, demokrasinin temeli, biraz önce de vurguladığım gibi, hak ve 
özgürlüklerdir. Her insan belli haklarla doğar ve bu haklar hiçbir şekilde engellenemez ve 
sınırlanamaz. İletişim de bu haklardan biridir. Geleneksel ve toplumsal nedenlerle vatandaşlarımızın 
bir kısmının anadillerini kullandıkları bilinen bir gerçektir [...] Bize düşen, demokratik devlet 
olmanın ve çağın gereklerine ve toplumun ihtiyaçlarına göre bir düzenleme yapma zorunluluğudur. 
[…] Bu, birlik ve bütünlüğümüzü korumanın ve farklılıklardan sinerji yaratmanın teminatıdır” 
(TBMM 2002d: 97). 
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Thanks to the outstanding efforts of the late Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü 
Zorlu, after Greece had started talks with the Common Market on the 1st of 
March 1960, on the 21st of April, a decision was made to continue the talks 
with both our countries together. Unfortunately, my dear friends, this process 
was cut short by the 1960 coup d’etat. Later, 1980 became another fateful 
year on our road to Europe. In that year, the Foreign Minister of the Demirel 
Government, Hayrettin Erkmen, announced that he would apply for full 
membership in order to avoid the probable veto by Greece, which was to 
become a member of the Community one year later. However, Erkmen’s 
political life did not last long enough; he lost his position after a question-
answer session in Parliament, and thus the project was sabotaged. The coup 
d’etat on the 12th of September caused a standstill in our relations with 
Europe until 1986, and as all of you know, this adventure started up again on 
April 14th 1987, when the Motherland Party Government applied for full 
membership.72 
Thus, in practical terms, the differences between the TPP and MLP seem miniscule. Where 
the TPP, in opposition, occasionally draws on centralist argumentation, the MLP holds on to 
its universalist frame of reference throughout the debates, and is able to do so due to its 
position as a government party. In terms of their overall positions, however, both parties 
argue for less state involvement in social life, and see the process of adapting to EU 
conditionality as a necessary step in the right direction. Their positions are thus largely in 
accordance with what we would expect based on their previous histories.  
5.3.6 The Felicity Party 
Like the MLP, the FP has a very high score on the universalist dimension of both the theme 
and argument analyses. Given the official anti-EU stance of the party, this is quite surprising. 
It is also somewhat unexpected in light of the fact that the FP, during the parliamentary 
period in question, was in opposition to the government coalition that drafted the bills. One 
would expect, first of all, criticism of the proposals, and secondly, that such criticism was 
                                                
72 “Dışişleri Bakanı rahmetli Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun üstün çabalarıyla, büyük gayretleriyle, 
Yunanistan'ın, 1 Mart 1960'ta ortaklık görüşmelerine başlamasının ardından, 21 Nisanda, her iki 
ülkenin birlikte bu görüşmeleri sürdürmesi kararı verilmiştir. Ne yazık ki, bu süreç, 1960 darbesiyle 
kesilmiştir değerli arkadaşlar. Daha sonra, 1980 yılı, Avrupa yolundaki kader yıllarımızdan biridir. O 
yıl, Demirel Hükümetinin Dışişleri Bakanı Hayrettin Erkmen, bir yıl sonra Topluluğa üye olacak 
Yunanistan'ın muhtemel vetosundan kurtulmak için üyelik başvurusu yapacağını açıklamıştır; ancak, 
Erkmen'in siyasî ömrü buna yetmemiş, bir gensoruyla düşürülmüş ve bu proje sabote edilmiştir. 
Arkasından gelen 12 Eylül darbesi, Avrupa'yla ilişkilerimizin 1986 yılına kadar kesilmesine sebep 
olmuştur ve hepinizin bildiği gibi, bu macera, 14 Nisan 1987'de, Anavatan Partisi Hükümetinin tam 
üyelik başvurusuyla yeniden başlamıştır” (TBMM 2002b: 33-34). 
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presented in centrist-nationalist terms, emphasizing the fact that the NPAA transfers 
sovereignty to a supra-national set of institutions.  
A closer reading reveals that much of the FP’s discourse does consist of criticism of the 
proposals. However, instead of objecting to the normative principles underlying them, their 
harshest criticism is directed at the half-hearted nature of many of the proposals. The FP 
places itself completely within a universalist frame of justification, and demands more 
liberalization, not less. Thus, the coalition government is told that “you have no intention of 
fulfilling the requirements of democracy. You still have no interest in our people’s rights and 
freedoms; what is more, you are afraid of rights and freedoms. In other words, you are afraid 
of the people and the nation.”73 
One possible explanation for this can be found in the FP’s thematic distribution within the 
universalist dimension. A notable feature of the FP representatives’ universalist discourse is 
their emphasis on rights. In the thematic analysis, themes relating to this cluster appear more 
often, in absolute terms, than in the discourse of any other parties. Moreover, within this 
cluster, their emphasis is primarily on rights pertaining to freedom of speech, thought, 
opinion, and conscience, with less emphasis placed on the wider terms ‘human rights’ and 
‘basic rights.’ Although the variable ‘Rights’ used in the theme analysis does not capture the 
distinction between these two concepts, a secondary theme analysis reveals that a majority of 
the units loaded on this variable for the Felicity Party belong to the latter category (see Table 
1).  
Table 1 
 RPP DLP NAP TPP MLP FP JDP 
Basic 
human 
rights 
33 13 13 43 37 12 34 
Freedom 
of speech, 
conscience 
12 19 7 10 11 44 19 
 
                                                
73 “Demokrasinin gereğini yapmak diye bir niyetiniz yok. İnsanımızın hak ve özgürlükleri, sizi, hâlâ 
ilgilendirmiyor; hatta, siz, hak ve özgürlüklerden, yani, halktan, milletten korkuyorsunuz” (TBMM 
2002c: 61). 
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A plausible explanation would thus be that the FP, as a party representing an Islamist 
identity movement, supports widening the scope of freedom of speech out of self-interest. 
There are several examples of passages that would support such a conclusion. For example, 
during a question session regarding changes to the Criminal Code that were meant to 
strengthen freedom of speech, one FP representative asks the Minister of Justice, Hikmet 
Sami Türk (DLP), whether the amendment implies that a number of imprisoned journalists 
from the daily newspapers New Asia (Yeni Asya) and the National Newspaper (Millî Gazete) 
may be acquitted and freed.74 These newspapers have well-known connections to the 
Islamist Nurcu and National Outlook movements, respectively, and at the time of the debate, 
New Asia had recently been sentenced to close down for one month.75 
Similarly, when discussing measures to strengthen civil society, examples are taken 
primarily from Islamic associations. At one point, an FP speaker begins his argument by 
referring to the importance of religious associations. Upon being asked to specify what kinds 
of religious associations he is referring to, he answers that he means religious communities 
in general. However, when giving examples of the activities of these associations, all of the 
examples are Islamic associations (TBMM 2002d: 53-4). 
Moreover, the arguments where the Law on Political Parties is discussed leave no doubt that 
the FP’s stance, like that of the TPP, is informed by the experiences of its predecessor 
parties. However, while the TPP draws on parallels to historically remote parties, the FP’s 
predecessor parties have had recent brushes with the centrist elite. One FP representative, 
criticizing what he perceives to be vague formulations in one of the proposals, states that in 
the past, “tens of parties were closed, supposedly by court orders, but everybody knows that 
they were closed by politics, by the requirements of economic conditions, or arbitrarily. […] 
In one respect, to close a party is to deal a heavy blow to democracy’s right of life.”76 Later, 
                                                
74 “Yine, bu değişiklikle, şu anda hapishanede bulunan Yeni Asya Gazetesi sahibi Sayın Mehmet 
Kutlular, Fikret Başkaya ve benzeri düşünür ve yazarlar, beraat ve tahliye imkânına kavuşabilecekler 
mi? Yine, 312'den mahkûm olan birçok yazar, Yeni Asya Gazetesi yazarları, Millî Gazete yazarları 
ve daha birçok gazetenin yazarları bundan istifade edebilecek mi, bunlar hakkında beraat kararı 
verilebilecek mi?” (TBMM 2002a: 33). 
75 This occurred on 24 January 2001. On the history of Yeni Asya, see Yavuz (2003: 173). Millî 
Gazete has been a self-declared supporter of Erbakan’s parties since the National Order Party. 
76 “Onlarca parti kapatıldı, sözde, mahkeme kararıyla kapatıldı; ama, herkes biliyor ki, siyaseten 
kapatıldı, konjonktürün gereği olarak kapatıldı, keyfî olarak kapatıldı. […]. Siyasî partiyi kapatmak 
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presenting the FP’s own proposal meant to make the criteria for closing a party less 
equivocal, one MP says: “Look, last year, after the party that we were members of was 
closed, we founded a new party. You didn’t experience it, so you don’t know…”77 
However, the FP’s universalist discourse cannot be completely reduced to a matter of self-
interest. On the one hand, passages are found where self-interest is obviously a contributing 
force, but on the other hand, universalist arguments are set forth that have no obvious 
connection to the interests of an Islamic movement. Like the TPP and MLP, the primary 
target of the FP representatives’ criticism seems to be what they perceive as an outdated, 
reified notion of state and society. As opposed to the two former parties, however, the FP in 
particular targets the notion that pluralist politics is as a dirty, subversive activity that must 
be held in check. “[T]here is an idea that wherever politics or politicians enter, it is like a 
microbe enters, as if anarchy or terror is about to enter.” 78 This notion is described as 
misguided both from a normative point of view and from the perspective of national 
interests. Furthermore, they extend this argument to cover several political factions, 
including ethnic minorities. Thus, broadcasting in minority languages such as Kurdish, “the 
language of millions of Kurds who feel more Turkish than the Turk,”79 is supported by 
reference to democratic principles.  
                                                                                                                                                 
demek, bir bakıma, demokrasinin yaşam hakkına önemli bir darbe vurmak demektir” (TBMM 2002c: 
46). 
77 “Bakınız, geçen sene bizim mensup olduğumuz parti kapatıldıktan sonra yeni bir parti kurduk. 
Sizin başınıza gelmedi, onun için bilmezsiniz...” (TBMM 2002c: 56-57). 
78 “Konferans deyin, bir yetkilinin, bir siyasî parti yetkilisinin konuşması deyin, kesinlikle halk 
eğitim salonuna girilmez; çünkü, siyasetin, siyasetçinin girdiği yere, sanki, mikrop girecekmiş, sanki, 
anarşi, sanki, terör girecekmiş gibi bir anlayış var” (TBMM 2002c: 58). 
79 “Merhum Türkeş'in ifade ettiği gibi, kendisini Türkten daha Türk hisseden milyonlarca Kürt'ün de 
lisanıdır Kürtçe” (TBMM 2002d: 118). 
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People will speak their minds. There is no valid objection to letting people 
speak their minds. You sometimes hear: “There are dangers to this country, 
we have special conditions.” This is true, every country has its dangers, and 
we also have dangers particular to us. There may be division, there may be 
threats to the basic principles of the Republic, and no one denies this. 
However, my friends, it is possible to preserve democracy using democracy’s 
own methods. Some people speak of militant democracy. No, democracy 
cannot be preserved by the methods of any totalitarian system. Consequently, 
we cannot preserve democracy with prohibitions and pressure, my friends. If 
it were thus, democratic systems would not widen the scope of freedoms, but 
narrow them.80 
Arguments such as these are difficult to reduce to a matter of self-interest. At best, they may 
be described as the outcome of an “enlightened self-interest,” as has previously been argued 
about the Justice and Development Party (Özel 2003: 175). Rather than push their agenda by 
conventional means, the FP seems to have realized the importance of wholeheartedly 
embracing “generalizable” principles as a means to achieving the particularist goals they 
have traditionally been associated with, even if this means supporting other ethnic and 
religious minorities with which they have little in common.  
In sum, the Felicity Party seems to stand completely behind liberalizing measures, and to do 
so, at least in terms of discourse, on the basis of universalist argumentation. In fact, they 
appear to have adopted universalist principles to such an extent that the question of 
democratization is severed from the question of EU membership, a notion that seems alien to 
most other parties. The FP’s official standpoint remains opposed to EU membership, a 
stance they justify with reference to cultural differences. Furthermore, in the eyes of the FP, 
modern, pluralist democracy is not an invention of the West, but is a notion that the Prophet 
Muhammad arrived at approximately 1400 years ago.81 There is therefore no reason to 
                                                
80 “Sonra, insanlar fikrini söyleyecek. İnsanların fikirlerini söylemesinde hiçbir sakınca olamaz. 
Deniliyor ki: "Bu ülke için tehlikeler var, bizim özel şartlarımız var." Doğrudur, her ülke için 
tehlikeler var, bizim için de özel tehlikeler var. Bölünme olabilir, cumhuriyetin temel ilkeleriyle ilgili 
tehlikeler olabilir; bunları kimse yadsımıyor; ama, demokrasiyi korumak, demokrasinin kendi 
yöntemleriyle mümkündür değerli arkadaşlarım. Birileri çıktı, militan demokrasiden bahsediyor. 
Hayır, hiçbir totaliter sistemin yöntemiyle demokrasi korunamaz; dolayısıyla, yasaklarla, baskılarla 
demokrasiyi koruyamayız değerli arkadaşlarım. Eğer böyle olsaydı, gerçekten, demokratik sistemler 
özgürlüklerin alanını açmazlardı, tıkarlardı” (TBMM 2002a: 29). 
81 “Hepimizin bildiği gibi, çağdaş demokrasiler temel hak ve hürriyetleri hedef alan bir sistemdir, 
çoğulcu, katılımcı, düşünceye dayanan bir sistemdir, hoşgörü ortamında gelişen bir sistemdir. 
Çağımızda insan hakları ve temel hürriyetler; eğitim özgürlüğü, din ve vicdan özgürlüğü, düşünce 
özgürlüğü, ifade özgürlüğü evrensel boyutlar kazanmış ve uluslararası kurum ve kuruluşlar da bu 
konularla ilgili oluşturulmuştur. Aslında, Avrupa'nın, Amerika Kıtasının, Afrika'nın 20 nci Asırda 
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equate democratization with EU membership. Thus, commenting that many more packages 
will need to be passed for the sake of democracy, one representative adds that “[w]hen we 
make all these efforts [to come], hopefully, they will not accept us into the European Union, 
because we will already have arrived at our goal.”82  
5.3.7 The Justice and Development Party 
The JDP participated in Parliament during two parliamentary periods, first as a minor 
opposition party, then as the ruling government party. In absolute terms, the number of units 
recorded in the theme analysis is therefore higher than those of any of the other parties. 
Within the theme analysis, the JDP scores highly on the theme clusters ‘International 
treaties/ agreements,’ followed by ‘Democracy’ and ‘Rights.’ The only cluster in which their 
score on the center-periphery dimension is surprisingly high, is ‘Statism/ centralism.’ 
Among the other traditionally “peripheral” parties, only the TPP comes close to this score, 
and as the argument analysis showed, this is explained by the fact that the TPP occasionally 
reverts to a centralist, nationalist frame during the third debate. For the JDP, however, the 
argument analysis displays an overall emphasis on universalist arguments, suggesting that 
the comparatively higher score on the ‘Statism/ centralism’ cluster must stem from a 
problematization of statist arguments.  
At closer inspection, is appears that the JDP’s discourse largely follows the division between 
the two parliamentary periods. Like the FP, the JDP representatives’ contributions to the first 
three debates are mainly in the shape of criticism of what they see as insufficiently clear 
formulations in the amendments. In particular, amendments that were meant to widen the 
scope of freedom of speech are criticized for leaving too much room for interpretation, and 
thus politicization, of the courts. According to the JDP and several other parties, many of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
gelmiş olduğu bu noktaya Hz Peygamber bundan yaklaşık 1400 sene önce daha anlamlı ve daha 
geniş boyutuyla gelmiş ve değinmişti” (TBMM 2002a: 47). 
82 “Bütün bu çalışmaları yaptığımızda, inşallah, bizi Avrupa Birliğine de almazlar; çünkü, istenilen 
amaca ulaşmış oluruz” (TBMM 2002d: 133). 
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three-party coalition’s proposals do not ameliorate the situation at all, but pave the way “for 
more misuse, and more interpretation.”83  
The high score on the theme cluster ‘International treaties/ agreements’ stems primarily from 
the fourth, fifth, and sixth debates, in which the JDP, having taken hold of the reins of 
government, sped up the reform process. The JDP’s discourse here focuses on explaining 
how the proposals relate to the political criteria of the accession acquis, and how these, in 
turn, relate to treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. There is no mention of external impositions like those found 
in the discourse of the RPP. Where the amendments receive more extensive justification, the 
JDP representatives take care to present them as developmental measures, with the EU 
membership as a secondary goal. Thus, “our goal is not something like entering the 
European Union. Our goal is to create a more democratic, more free, more peaceful country 
for the people.”84 
This notion of development constitutes the core of the JDP’s discourse, and enables it to 
establish a close link between the Kemalist theme of modernization and universalist themes 
like democracy, rights, pluralism and civil society. The JDP thus goes some way towards 
accommodating the queries of the RPP. On the whole, however, nearly every one of its 
arguments frames development in terms of democracy and rights. The latter terms, in turn, 
are closely associated with organizational freedom and civil society. “If people live with 
fear, and if a few people cannot come together and easily organize for a common and 
legitimate aim, then that country cannot be called developed.”85 Thus, one of Kemalism’s 
core ideas is put to use against the notion that only Kemalists know what is best for the 
country. 
                                                
83 “Getirilen şekil, 312 nci maddedeki tanımları muğlak ve müphem olmaktan kurtarmıyor, bilakis, 
daha suiistimale, daha yoruma açık hale getiriyor” (TBMM 2002a: 44). 
84 “Bizim hedefimiz Avrupa Birliğine girmek gibi bir şey değil; bizim hedefimiz, insanlar için, 
insanımız için daha demokrat, daha özgür, daha barışçı bir ülke yaratmaktır” (TBMM 2002a: 26). 
85 “Eğer, insanlar korkularla yaşıyorlarsa, birkaç insan bir araya gelip müşterek ve meşru bir hedef 
için rahatça örgütlenemiyorlarsa, o ülkede gelişmişlikten söz edilemez; olsa olsa baskıcı bir idareden 
söz edilebilir” (TBMM 2002d: 43). 
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Friends, today, the clearest measure of modernity, democracy, participation, 
and development, is the number, activity, and strength of a country’s civil 
society organizations. Your country is developed if the field of its civil 
society organizations is wide, and if the freest and most outspoken 
representatives of the people’s demands are able to raise their voices. 
Otherwise, you are a third, or even a fourth world country.86 
A detailed reading also confirms that where statist considerations are brought up, this occurs 
in the context of arguments which, much like those of the FP and MLP, attempt to 
problematize the assumptions that tend to turn the situational definitions of the “center,” 
perhaps best illustrated by the discourse of the NAP, into zero-sum games. In particular, the 
classical Kemalist notion of a unitary and transcendent “Father State” is criticized for being 
hopelessly out of date. The state, it is argued, should not be thought of as an entity that exists 
in spite of pluralist society, keeping the seams together, but as a set of institutions that work 
for the people, enabling harmonious coexistence and growth. Easing restrictions of civil 
society and freedom of speech should therefore not be thought of as patricide, but as means 
to create a happier family.  
For years, we were stubbornly determined to exalt our people by exalting the 
state. However, by exalting the state we belittled our people, and trampled 
human value and honor in the name of making the state permanent.87 
Esteemed friends, look: We are not faced with the choice of either 
democratizing Turkey or conserving its unitary structure. As long as both 
Turkey’s unitary structure and its democratization exists, why do we choose 
‘either/or’? We keep saying ‘black or white, right or wrong.’ It is not like 
that; we absolutely cannot get anywhere without seeing the grey tones 
between them. We cannot lock ourselves into these two options.88 
                                                
86 “Değerli arkadaşlar, bugün, çağdaşlığın, demokratlığın, katılımcılığın, gelişmişliğin en belirgin 
ölçüsü, bir ülkedeki sivil toplum örgütlerinin çokluğu, etkinliği ve güçlülüğüyle doğrudan orantılıdır. 
Eğer, ülkenizde sivil toplum örgütlerinin sahası geniş tutulmuşsa ve bunlar, halkın taleplerini özgürce 
ve en yüksek sesle yönetenlere haykırabiliyorlarsa, o zaman, gelişmiş bir toplumsunuzdur. Aksi 
takdirde, üçüncü, hatta dördüncü dünya ülkesi konumundasınızdır” (TBMM 2002b: 40). 
87 “Biz, yıllarca, devleti yüceltelim ki, insanımız da yücelsin azim ve gayreti içerisinde olduk; ancak, 
devleti yüceltirken, insanımızı küçümsedik ve devleti payidar kılmanın yolunu, insan haysiyet ve 
onurunun çiğnenmesinde bulduk” (TBMM 2003b: 26). 
88 “Değerli arkadaşlarım, bakınız, ‘Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesi ya da Türkiye'nin üniter yapısı’ 
gibi bir tercihle karşı karşıya değiliz. Hem Türkiye'nin üniter yapısı hem Türkiye'nin 
demokratikleşmesi varken, niçin ‘ya...ya da’ tercihini seçiyoruz ‘veya’ tercihini seçiyoruz? Biz, 
diyoruz ki: ‘Ak veya kara, doğru veya yanlış.’ Böyle değildir, aradaki gri tonları kesinlikle 
görmezlikten gelemeyiz, kendimizi bu şekilde bunlara kilitleyemeyiz” (TBMM 2002a: 72). 
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This basic argument is applied to nearly all aspects of the amendments. For instance, the idea 
that ethnic and linguistic pluralism are threats to the state’s unity is repeatedly denied. 
Perhaps reflecting the fact that some of the JDP’s members come from former Kurdish 
parties, the JDP representatives here show themselves to be more in touch with the realities 
of millions of Turkish citizens who, increasingly at ease with cultural pluralism and 
connected to the world through global media, are nonplussed by the Kemalist elites’ 
restrictive attitude.  
Esteemed friends, it is our common duty to preserve and protect the 
indivisible unity of the State of the Republic of Turkey, in every law and in 
every institution. However, it is not enough to produce new laws in the State. 
You may broadcast in Kurdish and Persian; in fact, whether you like it or not, 
people are doing it, they are setting up satellite dishes and listening to 
broadcasts in English, or Arabic, it makes no difference at all. You must 
privatize their minds, and they will develop in a healthy manner; these minds 
will protect the unity of the country, they will show how it can be developed. 
[…] All of the people of this country are working for its unity and 
togetherness, Kurds, Persians, Laz, Circassians, Alevis, Sunnis, Armenians, 
and Jews. The unity and togetherness of this country, its salvation, depends 
on our grasping the age.89 
Interestingly, the above quote also illustrates one of the most important points at which the 
JDP’s discourse differs from that of the FP. While the FP’s arguments for religious diversity 
and freedom of conscience have distinct undertones of self-interest, no such connotations 
emerge from the arguments of the JDP. The JDP representatives take care to speak of 
minorities in general, also when mentioning religious minorities. In addition, instead of 
claiming Islam as the defining value system of the Turkish people, the JDP develops a 
notion of “privatization,” where questions pertaining to religious and ethnic identities are 
removed from the domain of the unified state, and allowed to compete on equal terms with 
other political interests. In terms of basic regimes features, then, the term “minorities” should 
ultimately be removed, and relegated to the private sphere: 
                                                
89 “Değerli arkadaşlar, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin bölünmez bütünlüğünü, her kanunda, her 
kurulda saklamak, onu korumak hepimizin görevidir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinde kanunları 
çıkarmak yetmiyor -siz, radyo ve televizyonlarda Kürtçe yayın, Farsça yayın yapabilirsiniz, zaten 
yapılıyor, istemeseniz de yapılıyor; çanak anteni koyuyor, dinliyor adam, İngilizce, Arapça hiç fark 
etmiyor- kafaları özelleştireceksiniz, beyinler sağlıklı gelişecek; beyinler, bu ülkenin bütünlüğünü 
koruyacak, nasıl gelişebileceğini gösterecek [...] Bu ülkenin bütün insanları, Kürdüyle, Acemiyle, 
Farsıyla, Lazıyla, Çerkeziyle, Alevîsiyle, Sünnîsiyle, Ermenisiyle, Yahudisiyle bu ülkenin birliği ve 
beraberliği için çalışmaktadır. Bu ülkenin birliği ve beraberliği, bu ülkenin kurtuluşu, çağı 
yakalamasına bağlıdır” (TBMM 2003b: 44). 
 75 
This is what we should be saying: There are no minorities in Turkey, there are 
citizens of the Republic of Turkey. These citizens are able to worship and 
believe as they wish. They should be able to build mosques, synagogues, and 
churches as they want […] Dear friends, this needs to be accepted, and just as 
it must gain wider acceptance, it needs to be completely widened, and the 
question of minorities completely removed. This is one of Turkey’s basic 
problems.90 
Another point at which the JDP differs from the FP lies in its use of historical narrative. 
Much like the FP, the JDP seems to see no paradox in maintaining pride for the nation’s 
history and achievements, and at the same time developing the democratic values associated 
with the West. However, while the FP argues that what are usually thought of as “Western” 
values are in fact intrinsic to the Islamic world, the JDP sees them as distinctly Western, and 
precisely for that reason worthy of imitation. There is no element of the “international 
competition in cultural and religious terms”91 spoken of by the FP. Instead, adopting the best 
elements of other cultures is presented as a distinctly Turkish quality.  
Esteemed friends, the adventure we Turks have been experiencing for the last 
2000 years has always gone from the East to the West. The armored 
cavalrymen on horseback on the steppes of Central Asia, our forefathers who 
came to Anatolia as a migrant group, were never forced to assimilate or 
appropriate the values of the cultures and civilizations they encountered. They 
mobilized their own peculiarities, their own opportunities and abilities in 
order to establish, develop, and spread the values of the new civilization. 
Thus, during the last thousand years they bequeathed two large empires and 
states to the world’s political history. However, we, who have played such an 
active role for nine hundred years, have unfortunately during the last one 
hundred years lost become inactive.92 
                                                
90 “Bizim şunu söylememiz lazım: Türkiye'de azınlık yoktur, Türkiye'de Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
vatandaşları vardır. Bunlar ibadetlerini, inançlarını istedikleri gibi yaşayabilirler. Cami nasıl 
yapılıyorsa, havrasını da, kilisesini de öyle yapabilmelidir [...] Değerli arkadaşlar, bunun kabul 
edilmesi, hatta daha da geniş kabul edilmesi gerektiği gibi, aslında bunun tamamen genişletilmesi ve 
azınlık meselesinin ortadan kaldırılması gerekiyor. Bu, Türkiye'nin temel sorunlarından birisidir” 
(TBMM 2002d: 56). 
91 One FP representative argues that “We need to strengthen civil society in a way that will allow it to 
strengthen us and our own cultural and spiritual values and beliefs on the level international 
competition. Today, competition is not only about trade, but also about cultures, civilizations, 
conceptions and beliefs.” (“Bizim, kendi değerlerimizin, inançlarımızın, kültürel değerlerimizin, 
manevî değerlerimizin, uluslararası platformda, rekabet sahasında -ki, bugün, rekabet, sadece ticarî 
emtiada değil; kültürler, medeniyetler, anlayışlar, inançlar rekabet ediyor- bizi güçlü kılacak şekilde 
sivil toplumun güçlendirilmesine ihtiyacımız var”) (TBMM 2002d: 55). 
92 “Değerli arkadaşlar, biz Türklerin 2 000 yıllık tarih içindeki serüveni, sürekli olarak doğudan batı 
istikametine olmuştur. Ortaasya steplerinde at sırtında zırhlı süvariler, göçebe bir topluluk olarak 
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Note that this narrative also differs from that of the RPP and DLP in significant respects. 
While the RPP and DLP see Westernization as one of the hallmarks of Kemalism, the JDP 
presents it as having been stifled by precisely the same people who claimed to be its 
champions. Instead of contributing to the Westernization project of Atatürk, eighty years of 
Kemalist dominance has maintained only the authoritarian aspects of his legacy, thereby 
closing the country off to the positive effects of diversity and globalization. As a 
counterexample, “the tolerance of the Ottomans”93 is presented as the key to finding the right 
balance between a unified state and a pluralist society. “Look, how did the Ottomans solve 
this? The Ottomans said ‘oneness in multiplicity,’ that is, ‘unity within plurality, within 
pluralism.’”94 
In sum, in terms of both thematic salience, type of arguments, and overall characteristics, the 
JDP’s discourse lies somewhere between that of the FP and MLP. The few differences that 
can be discerned are largely attributable to the party’s position at the time of the debates. 
Like the MLP, the JDP sticks to a descriptive, explanatory discourse when presenting 
proposals that they have written themselves. Like the FP, it criticizes proposals in legalistic 
terms when it is in opposition. Throughout the debates, however, it draws on distinctly 
universalist frames.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Anadolu topraklarına gelen atalarımız karşılaştıkları yeni kültür ve medeniyet değerlerini 
özümsemekte ve benimsemekte hiç zorlanmamışlardır. Kendi özelliklerini, imkân ve kabiliyetlerini 
ise, yeni medeniyet değerlerinin yerleşmesi, gelişmesi ve yaygınlaşması için seferber etmişlerdir. 
Böylece, son bin yılda iki büyük imparatorluğu dünya siyasî tarihine, devletler tarihine hediye 
etmişler; ancak, bunun dokuzyüz yılında etkin rol oynayan bizler, ne yazık ki, bin yılın son 
yüzyılında birçok etkinliğimizi kaybetmiş bulunuyoruz” (TBMM 2003b: 35-36). 
93 “Osmanlının toleransından, hoşgörüsünden …” (TBMM 2002d: 72). 
94 “Bakınız, Osmanlı bunu nasıl halletmiş; Osmanlı buna ‘kesnet [sic.] içinde vahdet’ diyor; yani 
‘çokluk içinde, çoğulculuk içerisinde birlik’diyor” (TBMM 2002a: 72). 
 77 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis started from the hypothesis, suggested by several researchers, that the center-
periphery cleavage in the Turkish party system is giving way to a more complex system of 
party positions, where a third, universalist dimension is becoming increasingly dominant. 
Based on this assumption, we hypothesized that the parliamentary debates on the first six 
harmonization packages of the NPAA would be framed in universalist terms. To analyze the 
debates, we used a two-level content analysis. The theme analysis measured the quantitative 
salience of themes associated with the two dimensions on the level of noun phrases. The 
argument analysis measured the number of arguments that drew on each of the two 
dimensions. Finally, both levels of the analysis were compared and interpreted.  
The analysis has largely confirmed the hypothesis. It has shown that in quantitative terms, 
the universalist dimension has been dominant in framing the NPAA amendments. This has 
been the case both on the level of thematics and on the level of argumentation, with only one 
party, the NAP, emphasizing the opposite frame.  
However, a comparison of the theme analysis and argument analysis also uncovered slight 
discrepancies between the salience of universalist themes and the arguments in which they 
appear. As discussed in chapter 3, this is only to be expected. Text analyses that include 
more contextual information result in more ambiguous interpretations. Therefore, the further 
up on the inclusion hierarchy the analysis moves, the more equivocal the results become. In 
the final analysis, reading and interpreting the results in a qualitative manner must be 
expected to result in less clear-cut conclusions. In this case, interpreting the results 
demonstrated that there are no absolute divisions between the parties. A certain measure of 
universalism and particularism is present among all parties, but receives qualitatively 
different treatments.  
What has been uncovered in quite unequivocal terms is the fact that whatever the salience of 
the center-periphery frame, a universalist dimension has been added to the party system, and 
has become a frame of reference that cannot be ignored by any parties. It has been invoked at 
the thematic level by all parties in one way or the other. What differs among them is the 
relative priority given to the universalist frame in relation to the center-periphery frame. The 
discrepancy between the theme and argument analyses has thus been demonstrated to consist 
in different uses of thematics belonging to one or the other frame. While the overall tendency 
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has been to draw on universalist thematics in universalist arguments, there have also been 
examples of universalist thematics embedded within center-periphery arguments. Thus, for 
example, the RPP, DLP, and NAP all invoke minority rights in the context of arguing 
against such rights being imposed on Turkey. Conversely, from the opposite side of the 
spectrum, the MLP, FP, and JDP invoke the Kemalist thematics of progress, development, 
and modernity in the context of arguing for organizational rights and free speech.  
Kemalism thus proves to be an ideology so loosely defined that, as Heper argued more than 
twenty years ago, “even [Atatürk’s] opponents could pose as genuine ‘Atatürkists,’ because, 
when necessary, they could find a quotation from Atatürk, which apparently supported their 
point of view” (Heper 1985: 11). Interestingly, the peripheral parties seem to have realized 
this potential more than the center parties. Whether or not this is related to the “enlightened 
self-interest” mentioned by Özel (2003) is a matter that can ultimately only be resolved by 
future developments. At least at the level of discourse, the MLP, TPP, JDP, and FP seem to 
have had very few difficulties in accommodating the universalist norms underlying the 
amendments, while the parties associated with the center, the RPP, DLP, and NAP, have 
found it more difficult to adjust their ideological foundations. As a whole, they appear more 
ambiguous, and less willing to cede the ideological characteristics that have defined their 
parties for several decades.  
Nevertheless, the largest center parties have largely succeeded in selectively interpreting 
Kemalism in a way that differs dramatically from the militant nationalist emphasis of the 
NAP. In particular, the RPP has chosen to emphasize a largely symbolic dimension of 
Kemalist nationalism, drawing on themes of national pride and modernization in a way that 
seems to lend itself easily to accommodating the required reforms. In this context, it is worth 
remembering that “reformism” (inkılapçılık) was, and still is, one of the RPP’s official 
founding principles. It is therefore not surprising that the reform process accelerated after the 
elections of November 2002. While an uneasy blend of security issues and nationalist 
symbolism created difficulties for the tri-party coalition government that drafted the NPAA, 
the RPP seems to have kept to its promise to cooperate with the JDP in passing the required 
amendments, and has pragmatically adjusted its oppositional discourse to allow it to do so 
with its head raised.  
The results raise several questions that would be interesting to investigate further at another 
occasion. First, although the quantitative results do demonstrate a clear preference for the 
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universalist dimension, it would be desirable to widen the data base of future analyses to 
include larger amounts of text. Since the six debates covered here were conducted, three 
more harmonization packages have been passed, and more are on the way. Including them 
would not only strengthen the statistical significance of the results, but would also widen the 
number and types of issues debated, allowing for wider generalizations. For purposes of 
validation, it would also be desirable to compare the results with discourse contexts other 
than the TGNA, such as press conferences, party conferences, and other media appearances. 
This would provide greater control with contextual variables such as the composition of the 
Parliament, the degree of publicity, and the extent to which parliamentary rules of conduct 
inhibit the number of themes available for framing.  
Secondly, although the future of Turkey’s relations with the EU is intrinsically bound up 
with its democracy, ultimately, the question of EU membership will also depend on how 
political parties present the EU to the public. This study has focused on those issues that 
have historically been the most significant in determining inter-party competition, and has 
only secondarily touched on the more complicated issues arising from parties’ attitudes to 
the question of EU membership. However, the few quotes taken from the transcripts indicate 
that the prospect of EU membership has been a highly salient dimension of the parties’ 
understanding of the NPAA. They also indicate that, although the NPAA and the EU are 
interdependent issues, positions on one question do not correlate completely with positions 
on the other. Thus, it would be interesting to add the question of EU membership as a 
variable in future studies, and investigate how it interacts with the center-periphery and 
universalist dimensions.  
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